

CURRENT *History*

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NOVEMBER 1964

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CURRENT History

NOVEMBER, 1964

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In this issue seven articles are devoted to a survey of contemporary Russia. In a discussion of succession in the Soviet Union, our introductory author suggests that "In view of . . . the fact that the Secretariat served as a launching pad for both Stalin and Khrushchev, the odds are strong that the Party apparatus will be decisive in any post-Khrushchev leadership struggle. Only a strong, unified coalition of all the other command systems might have an outside chance to preempt a contender based in the Secretariat."

After Khrushchev: What Next?

By HOWARD R. SWEARER

*Associate Professor, Political Science Department,
University of California at Los Angeles*

ALTHOUGH seemingly robust, First Secretary and Premier Nikita Khrushchev is 70 years old. Whether he dies in office or, less likely, retires voluntarily or otherwise, a new crisis of leadership succession could happen at any time. In that highly politicized country, where political leadership plays such a dominating and pervasive role and the process of leadership transferral is not routinized, the departure of the old leader creates considerable uncertainty not only about the course of Soviet domestic affairs but also about Russia's role in the world. The wave of concern that engulfed the West last spring over the rumors of Khrushchev's death brought home clearly the importance of such an event for Russian and non-Russian alike.

Given man's mortality, leadership succession is an inevitable and universal problem

which provides a severe test for any political system.¹ Perhaps the greatest asset of a well-functioning constitutional democracy is that it provides for a smooth and rapid transfer of authoritative political leadership based on a high degree of public consensus. The immediate and uncontested assumption to the presidency by Lyndon Johnson under the traumatic circumstances of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963, clearly makes this point.

In contrast to the process of leadership transferral in the United States, the Soviet system historically has found succession very difficult. To maintain perspective, it must be emphasized that smooth leadership successions are the exception rather than the rule in most of the world. Even in an old and politically sophisticated nation like France, Charles de Gaulle's assumption to the premiership and then the presidency in 1958 was at the expense of the Fourth Republic; and his death promises to create serious problems.

¹ For a general discussion of the problem, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "Succession in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1964.

To highlight by contrast the dimensions of the Soviet succession problem, let us review quickly some of the factors favoring untrammelled succession in the United States (Great Britain or a number of other constitutional democracies could serve equally well as illustration). First, institutionalized procedures for the transfer of political power are legitimized and deeply ingrained in the national consciousness by long usage and theoretical justification. The viability of these procedures in turn rests on: 1) The underlying public consensus on major societal goals and procedures; 2) The general moderation exercised in political conflict and the toleration displayed by political opponents for each other based on a recognition that all participants in the political process are loyal to the nation (even if perhaps mistaken and misguided) and that no party has a total monopoly on truth and wisdom; 3) A general belief by the citizenry that it has a say, even though sometimes indirect, in the succession process; and 4) Limitations on the range of political activities and a splintering of political power on both geographical and functional lines so that the political world does not impinge totally and directly on all facets of a citizen's life.

As a corollary to these propositions, the President is substantially limited in his exercise of power by both formal and informal restraints. He is not normally in a position to effect fundamental alterations in the body

² A Soviet leader's power, however, is not unlimited; and, in addition, as Soviet society has matured and institutions have crystalized, the latitude permitted the leadership for widespread social engineering has probably declined. Khrushchev is less the architect of Soviet society than either Lenin or Stalin. See Howard R. Swearer, "Bolshevism and the Individual Leader," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XII, No. 2 (March-April), 1963, pp. 91-94.

³ Khrushchev related the following incident to the 22nd Party Congress: "When the anti-Party group was smashed, its participants expected that they would be treated in the same way they had dealt with people at the time of the cult of the individual and in the way they hoped to deal with those who favored the restoration of Leninist norms of Party life. . . ."

"Kaganovich called me on the telephone and said: 'Comrade Khrushchev, I have known you for many years. I ask you not to let them treat me in the vindictive way people were treated under Stalin.'" *Pravda*, Oct. 29, 1961.

politic, and, moreover, he would probably not be elected President if such were his intention. This is not to denigrate unduly the significance for public policy of the personality and policy orientation of the President; but, compared to his Soviet counterpart, his influence is markedly circumscribed. The Soviet supreme leader is much less restricted by institutional and conventional hedgés and hence his values, style and background have greater consequences for Soviet society.² This circumstance is what makes the question of Khrushchev's successor particularly intriguing.

THE SOVIET PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

If historical precedent has any relevance, the post-Khrushchev succession will 1) initially take the form of a period of self-proclaimed "collective leadership" during which intense in-fighting among the political élite in the Party Presidium will occur, followed by 2) the emergence of a single dominant leader. Historical analogy, to be sure, does not always provide a valid key to the future, for circumstances are never precisely duplicated; indeed, the manner in which the next succession is handled will provide important evidence about what, if any, fundamental changes have occurred in the Soviet system of government since Josef Stalin's death in 1953.

Since power in the Soviet Union is so concentrated and is wielded so extensively and intensively, the removal of the supreme leader poses a particularly difficult problem. The stakes in the game are so high, in terms both of personal power and the ability to make and enforce public policy, that the succession is difficult to resolve through a process of give-and-take and political compromise governed by ground rules on which all participants agree. After Stalin's death, with his methods of rule vividly impressed on the minds of his heirs, the succession struggle was especially intensified because of the fear that the losers might suffer the fate Stalin had meted out to his opponents.³ Defeat in leadership maneuvering in recent years has no longer proven lethal, but it still involves high penalties in

loss of power and status. Moreover, as a result of the barrage of propaganda over many years, the death of the old leader leaves a psychological void in the mass consciousness that complicates the job of his survivors. The cult of Khrushchev differs in nature and has not reached the proportions of that of Stalin—he has yet to be called the “driver of the locomotive of history.” Nevertheless, the glare of publicity on his person has largely eclipsed the rest of the political élite.

Transfer of leadership is further complicated because it has not been institutionalized. The Party statutes and the constitution simply do not recognize the problem because they maintain the myth of monolithic unity among the leaders and between the latter and the population, and assert that political authority resides in such collective organs as the Party Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet. According to Soviet political theory, multiparty systems, political conflict, leadership succession and other aspects of what Western political scientists have labelled the “political process” are the products of capitalist society, rent by class struggle. Since, by definition, Soviet society is fundamentally harmonious, its “collective leadership” can eschew disruptive political conflict and pursue the interests of the “working masses,” guided by the scientific propositions of Marxism-Leninism.

In fact, political struggle in the Soviet Union is pervasive and proceeds largely outside the constitutional-legal structure of the country. In addition to the absence of a formal institutional-theoretical framework for taming the political struggle, the concept of the right of a “loyal opposition” and the spirit of moderation and compromise accompanying it have not taken root; and, accordingly, the ability of a group of political leaders to share power and agree on pragmatically-grounded compromises is reduced. Opposition to official policies runs the risk of being branded “anti-Party.”

The participants in the next succession will be full-time professional politician-administrators, each with years of experience in a wide variety of posts, who play the game with

deadly earnestness. Those leaders at the apex of power have demonstrated their capacity to operate successfully in this demanding and often ruthless political system where political mistakes, power miscalculations, or failure to meet superiors’ demands can have swift and drastic personal consequences. Khrushchev’s successor will have to win power in this tough political arena; his authority will not be acknowledged just because he occupies temporarily a particular office.

ISSUES AND THE SUCCESSION

Although Soviet politics are highly personalistic, the rivalry for Khrushchev’s mantle will not be merely court intrigue, pursued in a vacuum without regard to consequences for society. It will be shaped and contained, and, at the same time, exacerbated by pressing domestic and foreign issues and by institutional arrangements. Heretofore it has been the nature of political dialogue in the Soviet Union for policy differences to harden into ideological disputes, thus reinforcing their intensity. Ideological considerations are drawn into policy disagreements because each side attempts to justify its own position and discredit that of its antagonists by reference to Marxist-Leninist scriptures. It is not easy to compromise and agree to disagree if an issue becomes encrusted with a doctrinal veneer. It remains to be seen whether the greater pragmatism manifested in policy-making under Khrushchev during the last five years will outlast his death.

Depending in part on their background and experience, contending leaders will espouse conflicting policy positions as they attempt to enlist support from various influential segments of the officialdom and to differentiate themselves from each other. For example, Khrushchev in 1954–1955 made an obvious pitch for the support of the military command by opposing Georgi Malenkov’s advocacy of increased production of consumer goods. Other issues that figured prominently in the post-Stalin in-fighting included: the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and foreign policy generally; reestablishing relations with Yugoslavia and

the broader problem of refashioning Soviet controls in Eastern Europe; the proper relationships between the Party and the governmental administration and between the Party and the armed forces; the means to increase agricultural production; the handling of Stalin's role in Soviet history and the rehabilitation of his purge victims, and yet others.⁴

What are some of the issues that may becloud the next succession? In the U.S.S.R., where the political élite intervenes in the economy directly to establish economic goals, the question of priorities for various branches of the economy is always difficult to resolve and opens up the possibility of bitter disagreement. More specifically, the old issue of the desirable ratio between the growth of consumer and heavy industry, around which the opposition to Georgi Malenkov crystallized in 1954, still smolders. Khrushchev himself, since 1960, has become somewhat of a consumerist and recently several distinguished economists have suggested the desirability of giving substantially higher priority to consumer industry⁵—a proposition that was castigated as anti-Marxist ten years ago. This issue is given added poignancy because the regime is faced with a revolution of raising

expectations, partly of its own making. The standards of living promised for 1970 and for 1980 in the 1961 Party Program do not appear realistic in 1964; and as the target dates approach, the leadership will have to explain how it was caught with its statistics down.

Equally perplexing are the deepening problems of economic administration with which the regime has been groping since the mid-1950's. As the Soviet economy has grown more sophisticated and complicated, the regime has been faced with the necessity of devising new administrative patterns which will allow greater initiative to local administrators and plant managers and permit increased flexibility generally so that more finely calibrated and timely economic adjustments can be made. At the same time, the maintenance of firm central direction of the economy by the political leadership must be ensured.

Thus far, although recognizing the problems and trumpeting the need for efficiency in production, the regime has been unwilling to implement any of the more radical suggestions to put the economy on a semi-market, partially self-adjusting basis, in part for fear that direct political direction of economic development would be undercut.⁶ Instead, Khrushchev has attempted palliatives in the form of a series of sweeping administrative reorganizations which have not impinged on the fundamental nature of the "command economy." Disagreements already visible among industrial administrators, Party functionaries, academic economists and planners on this sticky and multifaceted issue, which affects some of the basic tenets of the Soviet system, will continue and may intensify after Khrushchev's demise.

The post-Khrushchev leadership will be faced with a whole range of potentially divisive problems in its foreign relations. Perhaps the most critical issue will be the maintenance of Soviet influence over the world Communist movement, at the heart of which is the great Sino-Soviet schism. Although the Chinese have laid a large measure of the blame for the split on Khrushchev personally, the rift has become so yawning and the issues

⁴ For analysis of the post-Stalin leadership struggle, see: Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958); Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961); and Leonard Wolfgang, *The Kremlin Since Stalin* (New York: Praeger, 1962). Two excellent analytical studies of the general problem of succession in the Soviet Union which attempt to apply the lessons of the post-Stalin succession are: Myron Rush, "The Khrushchev Succession Problem," *World Politics*, No. 2 (January), 1962; and Brohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, No. 4 (November), 1960. For the reader who wishes to try his own hand at interpretation of the post-Stalin leadership struggle by examining the available Soviet materials bearing on the subject, see: Howard R. Swearer, *Politics of Succession in the U.S.S.R.: Materials on Khrushchev's Rise to Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964).

⁵ See, for example, A. Arzumanyan, *Prauda*, February 24, 1964.

⁶ For a discussion of the major proposals for reforms in economic administration, see: Alec Nove, "Revamping the Economy," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb.), 1963; and Marshall Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (April), 1963.

so intractable that it is unlikely that the basic contours of the confrontation will be altered by the departure of either Khrushchev or Mao.

There is the distinct possibility, however, that the Chinese might attempt to "fish in foreign waters" during a succession crisis in the Soviet Union.⁷ Both sides have already charged each other with meddling in their domestic affairs.⁸ Most probably the post-Khrushchev leadership would close ranks in resentment against any Chinese attempt to interfere in Soviet leadership politics; but if a highly embittered factional struggle should develop, one faction might be tempted to use the Chinese trump.

There are yet other issues which might inflame a succession crisis: e.g., the limits allowed writers and artists, the degree of private incentives to be permitted peasants; the deceleration or acceleration of de-Stalinization. But there is one order of policy disagreement which can be particularly disruptive of leadership consensus since it lies at the heart of any power struggle: the allocation of powers and responsibilities among various organizations and administrative hierarchies.

The locus of power in the Soviet Union is the Presidium (Politburo prior to 1952) of the Party Central Committee. A small body,

⁷ At the 22nd Party Congress Molotov was indirectly accused by Presidium member Otto Kuusinen of attempting to align himself with the Chinese. Kuusinen used the analogy that if Molotov could not "catch fish in domestic reservoirs," he might in "foreign waters." *Pravda*, Oct. 27, 1961.

⁸ Many Western observers believe that the Soviet leadership gave support to Marshal Peng Teh-huai, Chinese Defense Minister, in an abortive move to challenge the Mao leadership and its radical economic policies connected with the Great Leap forward in mid-1959. In a long attack on the Soviet position on September 6, 1963, in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, the Chinese *inter alia* accused Khrushchev of giving support to "anti-party elements in the Chinese Communist Party." For a translation, see *The New York Times*, September 14, 1963. On the other side, in addition to oblique references to efforts by the Chinese to link up with Molotov, Party Secretary Suslov, during his report on February 14, 1964, to the Party Central Committee, asserted: "That is why they [Chinese Communists] would like to isolate Comrade Khrushchev from the Central Committee for their subversive ends and to oppose our Central Committee to the Party and the Soviet people." For a translation of Suslov's remarks, see *The New York Times*, April 4, 1964.

normally consisting of 15 to 20 members, it may best be viewed as an interlocking directorate of the most important administrative commands of the Soviet system. In theory, the Presidium is responsible to the Central Committee, a body of 175 members and 155 candidates. Like the Presidium, though more broadly based, the C.C. is comprised of the power élite drawn from all important geographical areas and administrative commands.

Despite its impressive membership roster, the C.C. is not normally a decisive policy-making body. However, in a prolonged leadership crisis in which the Presidium is deadlocked, the authority of the Central Committee may increase. After Josef Stalin's death, Khrushchev moved vigorously to revive the moribund C.C. by calling it into session frequently to hear major policy reports. In a sense Khrushchev was attempting to play off the C.C. against the Presidium. Since the Party functionaries carried the greatest weight in the C.C., Khrushchev could generally rely on it for support.

In June, 1957, the C.C. was decisive in resolving the leadership struggle in Khrushchev's favor when he was challenged by the "anti-Party Group." Ironically, having thus released the Presidium from crippling stalemate, the power of the C.C. again declined. Nevertheless, the Khrushchev C.C. continues to meet regularly several times each year for a few days to hear major reports; and should another leadership deadlock occur in the Presidium, it might again play a major role.

Although the Presidium is the most authoritative body in the Soviet Union, it is not the head of a single administrative chain-of-command; and its members all occupy other positions of leadership in various institutions and organizations. During a factional struggle, these various bureaucratic hierarchies tend to get sucked into the fray as Presidium members mobilize institutional support behind them. Thus, the danger exists that a leadership struggle may spill out of the Presidium and convulse the entire system.

Although Stalin rose to power through his position as General Secretary, and hence boss of the Party apparatus, once he had defeated

his Politburo opponents, he moved to make his dictatorship highly personalistic and independent of a particular command structure. His dictatorship was enthroned on institutional rivalry and instability. The Party apparatus headed by the Central Committee Secretariat, the governmental-industrial administration headed by the Council of Ministers, the military command, the secret police and yet other command structures, each supervised by a Stalin lieutenant, interpenetrated and counterbalanced one another, ensuring that Stalin alone retained final authority for settling all major issues. By fragmenting authority Stalin guaranteed his own dictatorial position, and created a situation where no office could be regarded as a certain avenue to supreme power.

After Stalin's death, the power struggle among the leaders was extended into conflict among these rival command structures as contenders marshalled their institutional bases of support (e.g., Lavrenti Beria in the secret police, Malenkov in the Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev in the Party Secretariat). Institutional conflict was also stimulated because the responsibilities of the various administrative hierarchies were not clearly defined and overlapped.

Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev conducted his successful campaign for leadership from the post of Party First Secretary. Contributing to, and a product of, his victory was a wholesale expansion of the direct administrative powers of the Party apparatus—in agriculture and the secret police in 1953, and in industrial administration and the armed forces in 1957. Once victorious, Khrushchev reduced somewhat the enormous administrative burdens of the Party apparatus which threatened to undercut its discipline and élan. But, much more than was true under Stalin, it remains the dominant institution and the major integrative force in Soviet society. The importance of the Party apparatus is clearly revealed by the membership of the Party Presidium.

In contrast to Stalin's Politburo, since 1958 the Presidium has not had any member who could be considered representative of

the secret police or the military command. Until June, 1957, the representatives of the government out-numbered those of the Party apparatus on the Presidium.

The Party apparatus, which is composed of approximately 250,000 full-time, Party-paid functionaries (of a total Party membership of over 10 million), mirrors in microcosm the structure and activities of the entire society. At its apex stands the C.C. Secretariat and its staff, the latter divided into bureaus and departments. The most fertile spawning ground for political leadership has been the Party apparatus—especially long apprenticeship in its line operations: the secretarial hierarchy stretching from district secretaries at the bottom to the C.C. Secretariat at the top. Since a Party secretary is the most important official in any territorial-administrative division and is responsible for coordinating all state, Party and public activities in his bailiwick, he gains valuable administrative and political experience. Any man who has worked his way up this tough proving ground will have demonstrated his mettle as an accomplished administrator-politician.

In addition, since the Party apparatus has special responsibilities for important personnel appointments of all kinds, Party secretaries are well situated to build up personal political followings. Finally, the newer breed of Party secretary, now reaching the top, is very likely to have received some kind of higher technical education and is therefore better equipped than his forerunner to handle the problems of an industrializing society.

In view of the foregoing analysis, and the fact that the Secretariat served as a launching pad for both Stalin and Khrushchev, the odds are strong that the Party apparatus will be decisive in any post-Khrushchev leadership struggle. Only a strong, unified coalition of all the other command systems might have an outside chance to preempt a contender based in the Secretariat.

The longer the issue of succession remains unresolved, the more unpredictable will be its outcome and its impact on Soviet institutions. If, as appears likely, the next succession struggle centers *within* the Party appa-

ratus itself, there may be some fracturing of Party cohesiveness. Such fissures could occur along several lines. Since well before Stalin's death, three territorial Party organizations have been particularly powerful and have provided a majority of the top leaders: Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine. During the Khrushchev regime it has often appeared that the Leningraders and the Ukrainians have vied with each other for leading positions; Khrushchev may even have deliberately played them off against each other. Such contention could well carry over.

Secondly, in November, 1962, the Party was divided into agricultural and industrial wings. Although the industrial and agricultural branches are coordinated at the all-union and republic levels, the Party apparatus is entirely separated below. In addition, most of the staff of the C.C. Secretariat in 1956 was divided into two parallel branches: one branch serving the Russian Republic and headed by a Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., and the other serving the remaining republics. In 1963, two additional, less important geographical bureaus for Central Asia and the Transcaucasus were also created under the C.C. Thus, functional and geographical divisions of the Party apparatus might serve as the basis for political factions. Such factionalism would be accelerated if opposing groups of *apparatchiki* sought to enlist outside support in the military, the police or elsewhere.

Should extended bickering among the contending leaders and rival interests embark the Soviet Union on a dangerous leadership drift, or, in an extreme case, threaten the outbreak of violence, there might be a return to the harsher methods of Stalin or an attempt by the military to assume power in the name of protecting the national interest. The experi-

ence of the Khrushchev regime in ruling without the overt use of massive physical repression and the widely publicized condemnation of Stalin's crimes, however, would raise problems for any leader who attempted to reinstitute the regime of terror. The military was sucked into the political fray to some extent after Stalin's death; but with the ousting of Marshall G. K. Zhukov in October, 1957, and the campaign to reinforce political controls in the armed services, civilian leadership has been firmly reaffirmed. The military command would probably not attempt a coup unless it felt its interests or the security of the country were in serious jeopardy.

Even if factional struggle is avoided or contained within the top leadership, any leader who is successful in his bid for power will have to woo influential elements in the society and articulate their interests. The emphasis in leadership under Stalin was the setting of societal goals and the mobilization of the population for their fulfillment. In contrast, Khrushchev has appeared to give more weight to the leader's role as a political broker in compromising conflicting sets of interests and forces. Although the Stalin regime was not so monolithic in reality as it appeared from afar, there can be little doubt that in recent years there has been a great deal more pulling and hauling over policies within the ranks of the political élite, and that these disagreements have been more forcefully and frequently expressed in public.

In part this phenomenon, which may be loosely called bureaucratic pressure group politics, is a hangover from the post-Stalin interregnum period when the top leaders were in open conflict. It also results from the growing differentiation of interests as Soviet society modernizes. Finally, to enlarge his sources of information, and to encourage necessary innovation and initiative at lower levels, as well as to build up support for his regime by giving officials in the provinces a vicarious sense of participation in decision-making, Khrushchev consults a wider number of advisers and travels widely. Thus, he necessarily encourages a more candid and less dogmatic discussion of problems.⁹ Khrush-

⁹ In the author's view, Khrushchev's position has probably been solid since late 1957 and he has had the final word whenever he has wished to assert himself. It should be noted, however, that Western observers are not agreed on the firmness of Khrushchev's power. Some have interpreted the signs of élite disagreement and Khrushchev's backing and filling on policies as an indication that he has faced serious political opposition. For an enlightening debate on this subject, see: Carl Linden, Thomas A. Rigby, and Robert Conquest, "Conflict and Authority," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September-October), 1963.

chev's successor may well find himself propelled even further in the direction of political broker, especially if uncertainty during a succession interlude provides more opportunity for maneuvering by various conflicting interests.

A POSSIBLE HEIR

If the various divisive factors discussed thus far will make it difficult for a lasting oligarchy to succeed Khrushchev, another possibility for solving the succession conundrum might be for Khrushchev to designate his heir and thereby avoid a period of disruptive intense political in-fighting. This solution has been tried before and failed: Lenin attempted to squelch Stalin in his famous sickbed Testament; and Stalin, in turn, appeared to have favored Malenkov as his successor. Unless Khrushchev, unlike his predecessors, is willing and able to concentrate enough authority in the hands of his presumptive heir well before the succession problem arises so that the latter is securely ensconced in power, his position will be particularly perilous, because the other rivals will join forces to whittle down his political strength. On the other hand, the old leader is usually loathe to relinquish sufficient power before his death to any one lieutenant for fear that the beneficiary of his attentions might contest his decisions or even move to speed up the succession crisis.¹⁰

Still, some pre-arrangements for succession may be worked out. Khrushchev has been brooding over the problem for several years. In an interview with Averell Harriman in 1959 he asserted that he did not intend to

repeat Stalin's mistake;¹¹ and on several public occasions he has made such comments as "I cannot occupy forever the posts which I hold now in the Party and the state."¹² It is not impossible that Khrushchev will make some arrangement along the lines taken by the Chinese Communists where Mao Tse-tung in 1959 stepped down as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic (while remaining Party Chairman) in favor of Liu Shao-ch'i, who is generally recognized as the heir apparent.¹³

It remains to be seen, however, whether Khrushchev can find a candidate whom he trusts and with whom he can develop a close symbiotic relationship; and, if he does, whether he can succeed, where Lenin and Stalin failed, in making his choice last beyond the grave.

Thus far, three men have at different times loomed as possible successors to Khrushchev. From the defeat of the "anti-Party Group" in June, 1957, until early 1960, A. I. Kirichenko, Khrushchev's former associate in the Ukraine, appeared to have the nod. Promoted from Ukrainian First Secretary to second-in-command after Khrushchev in the Secretariat, Kirichenko exercised broad responsibilities for cadres and was able to place a number of his former Ukrainian cohorts in strategic positions. Still, his power was balanced by other Presidium members, who had risen rapidly under Khrushchev's aegis, like A. B. Aristov, N. G. Ignatov and especially Frol Kozlov. In early 1960, Kirichenko was abruptly dismissed without explanation—but possibly because Khrushchev felt he was becoming a threat.

Kozlov replaced Kirichenko as number two man in the Secretariat; and soon thereafter several of his former associates from Leningrad (where he had been Party boss) appeared in high places. Like Kirichenko, Kozlov's position was balanced by the continuing importance of such men as M. A. Suslov, A. N. Kosygin and L. I. Brezhnev and the promotion of new men like G. I. Voronov, D. S. Polyansky, N. V. Podgorny, and A. P. Kirilenko. The last three, plus Brezhnev, had come up through the Ukrain-

¹⁰ The reluctance of political leaders to relinquish power is, of course, not peculiar to the Soviet Union alone as witnessed by the careers of such different men as Adenauer and Franco.

¹¹ Averell Harriman, *Peace with Russia* (London: Victor Gollance, 1960), p. 105.

¹² *Pravda*, April 26, 1963.

¹³ The Chinese case, however, may be unique because Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao and the other five members of the Party Political Bureau's Standing Committee are old comrades in arms and have developed, through the decades of similar experiences, cohesive working relationships. Liu Shao-ch'i, however, is only several years younger than Mao. Hence, the real test of the Chinese capacity to handle the succession problem will come perhaps in a few years when younger men, not of the old guard, will be in contention for supreme power.

ian Party apparatus. Although he was thus hemmed in, Kozlov's strength appeared to increase steadily. His prominence was highlighted when he acted as chief spokesman at several C.C. plenary sessions and gave the second most important report (on the Party Statutes) at the Twenty-second Party Congress. Although far from conclusive, there is evidence that increasingly in 1962 and early 1963 he was advocating more conservative policies than Khrushchev on matters such as the treatment of liberal writers and artists, the production of consumer goods and Soviet relations with the West. In April, 1963, Kozlov suffered a severe second heart attack and stroke and was knocked out of political commission.

During the past year, speculation on Khrushchev's potential heir has centered on Brezhnev. During Kozlov's ascendancy, Brezhnev's star seemed to wane. In 1960, he was transferred from the Party Secretariat to the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, until then, a largely honorific post without much political leverage. After Kozlov's illness, he was again given a part-time seat on the Secretariat, retaining his governmental position; and, in July, 1964, was appointed full time to the Secretariat where he appears to stand directly under Khrushchev in importance.

Brezhnev, now 58, was a figure of some note even under Stalin. He has had vast experience at all echelons of the Party secretarial hierarchy and, in addition, for some time was chief overseer of Party work in the armed forces. Generally speaking, he may be considered one of the Ukrainian contingent.

Brezhnev's candidacy, however, is not assured, for there are several other likely contenders on the scene, including among others: former head of the Ukrainian Party organization and now Party Secretary, Nikolai Podgorny; First Deputy Chairman of the Party Bureau for the Russian Republic, A. P. Kirilenko; and perhaps even First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, A. N. Kosygin.

¹⁴ W. W. Rostow, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (New York: Norton, 1953), pp. 187-88.

Whoever succeeds Khrushchev will most likely have served at many levels in the Party secretarial hierarchy and will have had responsibility for cadre appointments so that he could build up a personal following, especially in one of the most important Party organizations like Leningrad, Moscow or the Ukraine. At the time of Khrushchev's death, or shortly thereafter, he will have been a member of the Party Presidium and, in addition, the C.C. Secretariat or, less likely, the Council of Ministers. He will probably have a technical education but will not have practiced his profession for some time. He is not likely to have had broad experience in dealing with foreign affairs. He will have the support of, or at least will not have alienated, the military. Finally, he will be a tough, extremely able manipulator of men and issues.

It would be rash to attach a name to this description. Few Western observers would have singled out Stalin in the early 1920's as Lenin's successor; and, similarly, in the early 1950's few students of the Soviet Union would have put their money on Khrushchev. The following estimate by one authority five months after Stalin's death did not appear unreasonable at the time and should serve as a caveat against unwary predictions about the outcome of post-Khrushchev Kremlinology:

Under Stalin, Khrushchev, was distinctly a figure of the third echelon in Soviet power, and it is altogether likely that in his present post of Secretary of the Communist Party he is not a leader of independent force. . . .

Like Molotov at a higher level, Khrushchev appears to be a figure being used by the major forces at work at high levels of the Soviet regime rather than an independent manipulator or con- niver for the highest policy-making power.¹⁴

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Surveying the present Soviet economic position, this specialist is reluctant to make any general comparisons. For, as he says, "Stalin rendered the greatest disservice to economists throughout the world by launching . . . the slogan that the Soviet economy could surpass that of the United States. This notion . . . has taken firm hold . . . and writers, including economists who should know better, find it difficult, when dealing with the U.S.S.R., to resist the temptation to compare it with the United States. . . . A particularly popular ground for comparison, followed often by startling conclusions, is the rate of economic growth. The unsoundness of this practice should be evident to those familiar with statistical methods."

Trends in the Soviet Economy

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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THE Soviet Union enters the second decade after the death of Stalin under the banner of peaceful coexistence, even though its leaders never tire of proclaiming their unwavering belief in the ultimate triumph of communism. Moscow and its satellites, however, no longer hold that the "inevitable" downfall of capitalism must be brought about, in each case, by force, by violent revolutions or civil wars. This revised attitude, which bears the personal imprint of Khrushchev, has led to the relaxation of international tension, particularly in Europe, and—combined with other factors—accounts for discernable changes in Soviet economic policies.

Their immutable objectives are the building of a huge machinery of industrial production, expansion of socialized agriculture, higher productivity of labor, and the betterment of the methods of economic planning. A relatively recent but increasingly important element in economic policies is aid for the underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the mammoth growth of the Soviet economy creates baffling problems of size and administration for which a solution is still to be found.

With the exception of farming (to be discussed presently) the overall picture of Soviet development in 1963, the fifth year of the seven-year plan, was one of steady progress or, to use Khrushchev's favorite term, "majestic" advance.

I

In Soviet industry, the plan for 1963 was over-fulfilled, the rise was ten per cent for the means of production and five per cent for consumer goods, that is, the traditional pattern of emphasizing heavy industry was maintained. The output of pig iron reached the new high level of 57.8 million tons; of steel, 80.2 million tons; of oil, 206 million tons; of coal (including coking coal), 532 million tons. The above plan output included mineral fertilizers, oil, steel, machinery, and a wide range of consumer goods (textiles, footwear, television sets, and so on).

Even more ambitious targets were set for the years 1964 and 1965 in a report submitted to the Supreme Soviet in December, 1963, by P. F. Lomako, chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee. This plan contained no striking innovations and provided for the preferential development of the advanced branches of industry, particu-

larly the chemical industry (production of mineral fertilizers), and chemical machine building; accelerated development of agriculture; intensive application of scientific and technical achievements to the economy; rise in labor productivity; and betterment of the cultural and material standards of the population. According to Lomako, "in 1964-1965 production capacities will be brought into operation on a considerably larger scale than in the preceding two years."

Financial policies conformed to the familiar pattern. The U.S.S.R. budget for 1963 closed, as usual, with a surplus. The revenue reached the record figure of 88.6 billion rubles and the expenditure, of 86.8 billion. The corresponding target figures were, respectively, 91.8 billion and 91.3 billion for 1964, and 101.2 billion and 100.4 billion for 1965. The turnover tax, which is a stiff sales tax, remains the chief source of revenue. It yielded 33.9 billion rubles in 1963 and is expected to yield 37.6 billion in 1965, but the budgetary contribution from withholding from the profits of nationalized industries, the next major source of state revenue, is expected to rise from 26.1 billion rubles in 1963 to 34.8 billion in 1965. The budget speech (December, 1963) of V. G. Garbuzov, U.S.S.R. Minister of Finance, contained the customary reference to the reduction of the population's (direct) payments into the budget, but it did not renew the promise of the total abolition of direct taxes. The budgeting for two years (1964 and 1965) rather than for one, was presumably planned to cover the two closing years of the seven-year plan and reflected the current tendency for longer range planning.

II

It is ironical that in a predominantly agricultural country, such as Russia was and still largely remains, farming should prove the least manageable segment of the economy. Khrushchev stated (December 9, 1963) that after World War II "in a number of provinces people were swollen with hunger and even dying for lack of bread. Yes . . . it is a fact that in 1947 in several provinces, for instance

in Kursk, people died of starvation." Speaking on February 14, 1964, Khrushchev said that "ten years ago . . . Soviet agriculture was in a state of extreme neglect."

The root of the matter—although this is not admitted in Moscow—was the collectivization of farming which was enforced with great ruthlessness in the late 1920's and early 1930's. After Stalin's death in 1953, a variety of measures were instituted to remedy the situation. The amalgamation of collective farms into larger units, which began in Stalin's lifetime, gained momentum, their number declining from 242,000 in 1949 to 55,000 ten years later. Taxation was revised to provide greater incentives for collective farmers. Compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce—the farmers' heaviest financial burden—were discontinued in 1958 and agricultural prices were raised. In the same year, the machine tractor stations, government agencies which owned all large agricultural machines, were closed, their equipment being purchased, with government assistance, by the collective farms.

The most spectacular and much-advertised agricultural venture was the drive for the development of the virgin lands of eastern Russia—the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan—launched by Khrushchev in 1953. A very large area—some 42 million hectares—was brought under cultivation and accounted for the immediate substantial increase in the grain crops. Khrushchev described this program at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist party in 1961 as "an achievement that will live through the ages."

The bulk of the virgin lands, however, is situated in regions noted for their arid climate and frequent devastating droughts. Their performance over a period of years proved disappointing. Khrushchev admitted (December 9, 1963) that "a harsh winter, followed by a severe drought, did damage to the major agricultural regions. The harvest was lower than last year and million of hectares of winter crops were destroyed." The government found itself compelled to buy abroad 12 million tons of grain which were paid for by exports of Soviet gold. It

was in this connection that Khrushchev referred to the 1947 famine when, starvation at home notwithstanding, "Stalin and Molotov" continued to export grain.

The disappointing results of the virgin land program led Khrushchev, the government and the Communist party to put their hopes in an extensive plan of technological improvement based on the use of chemical fertilizers. The question of "chemicalization" of agriculture was debated at great length by the Soviet Communist party in December, 1963, and again in February and July, 1964. Khrushchev proclaimed (February 14, 1964) that "the 'chemicalization' of agriculture is to all intents and purposes a revolution in agricultural production," and the decision to extend drastically the chemical industry—a "historic decision." The output of chemical fertilizers was to increase from 7 million tons in 1953 to 20 million in 1963, to 35 million in 1965, and to 80 million in 1970. Characteristically, Khrushchev held that "the plan for the accelerated development of chemistry is becoming the personal concern of every Soviet citizen."

How sound are these policies? There is no question that Soviet farming offers ample room for technological improvement. The application of chemicals in agriculture, however, is not an exact science and some of its basic theories are highly controversial; it remains to be seen whether the output of farm products can be actually "doubled and trebled in the shortest possible time on the basis of 'chemicalization' and the development of irrigation and mechanization," as demanded by Khrushchev. The lesson of the virgin land experiment would seem to suggest the need for moderation and caution which are not characteristic of the Soviet leader or the resolutions of the Communist party.

III

The use of chemical fertilizers, mechanization, and irrigation are expected to result in a great increase in the output of farming. An essential element in this program is the drive for the higher productivity of farm labor. Incentive methods of payment have

been in effect, since the beginning of collectivization, both on the collective farms (*kolkhoz*) and state farms (*sovkhoz*). In the summer of 1964, these principles were extended to the newly-created state old-age and disability pensions for collective farmers. The pension law of July, 1965, which had liberalized and made more comprehensive earlier legislation, did not provide coverage for collective farmers, who were expected to receive old-age and disability pensions from a special fund established by each collective farm.

This arrangement led to a great variety in practice. Khrushchev stated (July 13, 1964) that as late as 1953 "agricultural production was at an extremely low level. . . . Many collective farms did not even cover production expenses. . . . They had no money to pay for the work done by their members. Under these conditions, they could hardly make allocations to the pension funds or provide for the social security of the farmers."

The U.S.S.R. law of July 15, 1964, stipulated that collective farm members are entitled to state old-age and disability pensions. The qualifying age is 65 for men and 60 for women, and the precondition is employment in agriculture of at least 25 years for men and 20 years for women. The maximum and the minimum pensions are, respectively, 102 and 12 rubles a month (the same amount as old-age pensions under the 1956 law for workers living in rural areas).

Within these limits, the actual size of pensions is determined by the earnings of the recipient over a statutory period (average for any five successive years chosen by the applicant, out of the 15 years preceding retirement). The amount of the pension is equal to 50 per cent of the earnings up to 50 rubles a month, plus 25 per cent of the remainder. Disability pensions follow a similar pattern. Pensions will be paid from a special central social security fund which is to be formed by contributions to be made by the collective farms (their amount will be determined by the U.S.S.R. council of ministers) and by allocations from the federal budget. This law is to be put into effect on

January 1, 1965. It is believed that some 6.5 million people will benefit by its provisions and that the annual expenditure involved will come to 1.3 to 1.4 billion rubles.

It is officially emphasized that the approach of the law is not "levelling" and that the amount of the pension is linked to the economic status of the farm, its output record, and the members' participation in collective work. The law, it is argued, will contribute to the stability of agricultural employment and enhance the productivity of farm labor. The pension law, its restrictive nature notwithstanding, is a step towards providing the collective farmers with a modicum of social security. In the light of previous experience with incentive devices, it is unlikely that it will promote appreciably the productivity of farm labor.

Another law of July 15, 1964, raised by an average of 21 per cent the pay of workers in education, public health, housing, communal economy, commerce, public catering and other branches of the economy that serve the public directly. The minimum monthly wage for workers and employees "everywhere" is to be raised to 40 to 45 rubles. It will be remembered that since January 1, 1961, \$1 = .9 ruble.

IV

With the rapid expansion of the Soviet economy indicated in the opening section of this article, the perennial problems of planning and administration assumed new urgency. Lenin was a great revolutionary but his ideas of how to run the business of a large country were surprisingly naive and remote from reality. He argued in 1917 that bureaucracy would disappear under socialism and that all economic activities could easily be carried out by untrained people drafted into government service for short periods.

The Bolshevik leaders learned later that business management was not a simple matter. With the relentless growth of the economy, planning, too, became increasingly complex and exacting. The post-Stalin era witnessed far-reaching changes in the structure of the

economic agencies and important readjustments in the planning procedure. Since the 1920's, five-year plans were the symbol and the banner of Soviet economic development. However, the sixth five-year plan, which was inaugurated in 1956, was superseded three years later by a seven-year plan covering the period 1959 through 1965.

A major reorganization of industrial controls was enacted in May, 1957, when 25 federal economic ministries were abolished and their functions were transferred to the councils of 105 newly-formed administrative economic regions. The reform aimed at the decentralization of the administration but not of control; its declared object was to establish a closer relationship between the supervising agencies and the producing enterprises, while the authority and powers of the planning bodies were strengthened. The original scheme of the administrative economic regions did not prove satisfactory and was extensively revised in 1961 and again in 1962-1963. There were frequent charges that the administration of the regions was parochial in spirit, sacrificing national interests to the local ones.

The planning procedure, too, underwent important changes. In March, 1963, there was established the Council of the National Economy attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers "as a supreme agency for guiding industry and construction." D. F. Ustinov became chairman of the new council as well as vice chairman of the Council of Ministers. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan), formerly the highest planning agency, was subordinated to the Council of the National Economy.

These developments suggest that, nearly four decades after the inauguration of planned economy, the riddle of efficient business management under socialism is still awaiting a solution.

V

If Lenin erred in his evaluation of the nature of business management, he was on sound ground in his analysis of the perhaps *décisif* rôle of the disintegration of the colonial

empires in undermining the position of the Western bourgeois powers. This notion was never entirely absent from the minds of the Kremlin leaders, but it could not be effectively applied in practice until after the colonial system was shattered by World War II, while at the same time Soviet military and economic potentials were greatly increased. Promotion of colonial revolution was the object of the first congress of the Eastern peoples organized by the Soviets at Baku in 1920, but this meeting had no practical consequences.

Economic aid to underdeveloped countries as a weapon of revolutionary propaganda was not used extensively until well after World War II. Simultaneously, closer economic ties were established among the Communist countries. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), an association of Communist states for economic cooperation, was organized in 1949 but for several years remained dormant. An important reconstruction of COMECON took place in the summer of 1962 when there was created the Executive Committee of the Council which is composed of the deputy heads of the participating countries' governments and meets once every two months.

Simultaneously, several general economic and branch departments were set up (general economic studies, methodological and economic research, coordination of scientific and technological research, statistics, money and finance, standardization, and so on). Coordination of long-range planning, more specifically harmonization of the plans for the 1966-1970 period, is the Council's immediate task. It is officially noted that differences of method and procedure in the planning practice of the member countries are still numerous and it is one of the Council's objectives to iron them out. An agreement negotiated by the Council and signed on October 22, 1963, provided for the multilateral clearings in transferable rubles among the Council's members and the organization of an International Bank for Economic Co-

operation. These policies are likely to result in a closer cooperation among the Communist countries.¹

In 1953, the Soviet Union actively entered the field of economic aid to underdeveloped countries, formerly the preserve of the United States and Great Britain. The time appeared ripe. Ten years later (August 7, 1963), *Pravda* noted with satisfaction that

the imperialists have been driven out of all their important possessions in Asia. More than 80 per cent of the Africans have smashed the chains of slavery. The flames of victorious struggle have spread to Latin America. The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism has entered its final phase.

The organ of the Communist party then quoted Lenin's dictum:

The revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now be successfully developed, can be solved only in direct connection with the revolutionary struggle of the Soviet republic against international imperialism.

The countries of Asia needed less than 12 years to achieve independence. In Africa, events were moving even faster. In 1955, at the time of the Bandung conference, there were four independent African states (not counting the Union of South Africa); during the next eight years, 28 African territories achieved independence. In the earlier stages of the colonial revolution, the Soviet Union rendered the insurgents important moral and material support, including shipment of weapons (for instance, in Algeria). "The U.S.S.R.," said *Pravda*, "is on the side of all peoples waging a heroic struggle for the overthrow of colonial oppression." At the present time the situation has changed. "The chief form in which the revolution is developing is the struggle of the patriotic forces for the consolidation by the young states of their political independence, for the transformation of these states into instruments of national democracy, for achieving economic independence and a rise in the living standards of the masses." The Soviet Union has adjusted its policy to meet this situation. "The policy of peaceful coexistence," said *Pravda*, "ensures the most favorable international

¹ See also Vaclav Mares' article, "Eastern Europe's Second Chance," pages 272-279 of this issue.

conditions for the development of the struggle by the peoples of the liberated countries to solve the problems of the new stage of the revolution."

The chief economic weapon used by the Soviet Union to prevent the survival or resurgence of colonialism is economic aid. In 1963, the U.S.S.R. was assisting more than 20 underdeveloped countries. Over 480 industrial enterprises and other installations were being built with Soviet assistance, and the aggregate Soviet grants to former colonial countries were about 3 billion rubles. The most ambitious of these projects are the gigantic Bhilai iron and steel plant in India and the Aswan High Dam in the United Arab Republic. Other beneficiaries of Soviet munificence are Indonesia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Cambodia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Ethiopia.

Economic aid, which usually comprises the training of local workers by Soviet instructors, has added greatly to the popularity of Soviet communism. It would have been impossible without the economic advance of the Soviet Union and, from the standpoint of those who believe in the benefits of the emancipation of the colonies and in social revolution, may be regarded as a historical justification of the onerous and inhumanly cruel speed of Russian industrialization. Foreign aid is an essential feature of Soviet economic policy today.

VI

Stalin rendered the greatest disservice to economists throughout the world by launching a quarter of a century ago the slogan that the Soviet economy could surpass that of the United States. This notion, the denigration of the "cult of personality" notwithstanding, has taken firm hold of the imagination of the world, and Russian and foreign statesmen and writers, including economists who should know better, find it difficult, when dealing with the U.S.S.R., to resist the temptation to compare it with the United

States. Nikita Khrushchev indulges in this distressing practice with all his customary zest.

A particularly popular ground for comparison, followed often by startling conclusions, is the rate of economic growth. The unsoundness of this practice should be evident to those familiar with statistical methods.

The very admirable study, *On the Accuracy of Economic Observations*, by Professor Oskar Morgenstern of Princeton University,² reaches the conclusion that "precise use of growth rates are entirely inadmissible, whether for comparing different countries or shorter periods in the same country."

In the Soviet Union, the methodological questions involved are studied by several organizations of which the most authoritative one is the Learned Council on the Complex Problem: "Economic Competition of the Two Systems and the Underdeveloped Countries," attached to the Presidium of the Academy of Science. Commenting on the conference on methodological questions held in April, 1963, under the auspices of the Council, *Vestnik Statistiki* notes (June, 1963) that "comparing . . . living standards in the U.S.S.R. and in the United States is an extremely complex task," a welcome observation which applies equally to other fields of economic activity.

Obviously, the economic picture of a nation cannot be reduced to a few index numbers and conclusions drawn from the comparison of such indices are likely to be a source of misinformation and confusion rather than of enlightenment.

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² See Oskar Morgenstern, *On the Accuracy of Economic Observations* (2nd ed.; Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963.)

Emphasizing the trends presently at work in East Europe this economist writes, "After such virulent earthquakes every eight years—Yugoslavia in 1948, Hungary in 1956, Rumania in 1964—one must wonder how much internal cohesion still exists in what once was called the Soviet East European empire. De-Stalinization assumed there the forms of de-satellization. Colonialism is definitely on its way out—this time in East Europe also. While much is still to be accomplished to assure personal freedom and the right to the pursuit of happiness . . . the display of independent actions made recently . . . has been truly amazing."

East Europe's Second Chance

By VACLAV E. MARES

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THE YEAR 1964 was full of historically evocative dates. Looking backward 25 and 50 years, it offered multiple occasions to remember such momentous events as the crisis of Sarajevo, the Hapsburg war declaration on Serbia, its chain reaction in the form of a dozen war declarations criss-crossing Europe; and later, Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, his deal with Stalin and their Polish campaign, and the first air raids over Britain. In reviewing these ominous days of twentieth-century history, one was tempted to pause and note how differently these events or their consequences affected the destinies of Europeans. Everywhere, of course, the wars and the great depression caused personal tragedies, losses and sufferings. But those who survived these cataclysms had widely different chances to make up for the wasted years, depending on where in the old continent they happened to live. While such opportunities were many and widespread in Western Europe, they were few

and reserved only for the new political élite in Eastern Europe.¹

Since the days of early industrialization in the West, there has always been a gap between the levels of personal prosperity of East and West Europeans. This gap has neither been closed nor narrowed by the postwar social changes and industrialization programs in the East. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the contrast between the western and eastern comforts and discomforts of daily life seems to be much sharper today than it has ever been before.

It would be unfair, however, to blame the Sovietization of the economies of Eastern Europe as the only cause of the privations and rigidities to which its people are incessantly exposed. Another, older cause which blocked progress in that area and which deprived the East Europeans of the benefits of lower production costs and higher incomes, was the conflict which has existed since the beginning of this century between the centrifugal forces of their national aspirations and the centripetal forces of modern production techniques. The breakdown of the old Hapsburg monarchy into six separate customs territories came just at a time when its existing common market, most promising for potential buying

¹ The terms "Eastern Europe" and "East Europeans" are in this article used in their political sense. In spite of a certain geographical inconsistency, they include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Only in references to pre-World War II years do these terms include also territories and peoples of Yugoslavia and Albania.

power, could have offered to the Danubian empire—the former Christian bulwark against the Turks—a new justification for its existence. In this way, the East Europeans lost their opportunity to catch up with the West where, in the interwar decades, economic development stagnated and where only 30 years later the common market idea became a new and powerful prosperity stimulus.

EAST EUROPEAN "POLYCENTRISM"

The damage that Eastern Europe suffered by this missed opportunity was later compounded by frequent shifts in the boundaries dividing her small customs territories and by shifts in power centers which, in turn, controlled the area.² The development plans for a particular region followed different goals depending on whether they were directed from Vienna or Budapest, the old imperial capitals, or, later, from the six national capitals, or during the Nazi era, from Berlin. Long-term development projects involving several countries—such as navigation on the Danube, canal connection between the Baltic and the Black Sea, area-wide railroad, highway, and electrification projects—could never be agreed upon and completed under the same continuing political regime; most of them, therefore, never advanced beyond the draftboard and intergovernmental committee stage. "Polycentrism," with frequently shifting power centers, thus became Eastern Europe's predicament long before Togliatti, the late head of the Italian Communist party, applied this sophisticated term to "dissidentism" within the Communist world.

As a result of these developments, the Kremlin found after the last war a highly diversified but unbalanced structure of public investments and industrial enterprises in the East European area. Some of the latter

grew up in response to the profit-seeking motivations of the old capitalistic economy; others owed their existence to various political needs of the regimes and power centers which ruled in that area for some period of the first half century. Among such political investments were many from the years of national autonomy, the existence of which was once motivated by some ill-conceived ideas of national security or prestige.

The extension of the Kremlin's political control over Eastern Europe offered to her people at least some positive prospects. It could be anticipated that, finally, East Europe's existing productive facilities would be overhauled and new ones added in some coordinated way; that long overdue public development projects, as those mentioned above, would eventually be executed; that Moscow's political authority would force the individual national administrations to accept some kind of master plan for the long-range development of the whole area; and that, while such a plan would, naturally, aim toward the Soviet power build-up as its supreme goal, it would also assure progress towards regional specialization, higher productive efficiency, and higher living standards everywhere in Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949 and the tasks that were assigned to it in the 1950's pointed in this direction.³

COMECON'S TASKS . . .

The Council's original task was to compensate by financial assistance those Bloc members who were not allowed by the Kremlin to join the Marshall Plan. In the early 1950's, in response to the integration movements in Western Europe, other tasks were added to the Council's agenda. In its meetings were discussed such problems as a "just" allocation of Polish coal and of Krivoj-Rog iron ore among the Bloc members, technical specialization among existing plants, coordination of certain investments, and so on. The Council, however, could only formulate and propose recommendations to the member governments which were free to accept or to

² Affected by such territorial transfers in particular were people and establishments in the following border provinces: eastern Silesia, southern Slovakia, Ruthenia, Bessarabia, Moldavia, Transylvania, Dobrudja, Banat and Backa.

³ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON, or CMEA, or CEMA are synonyms. In this article the terms "COMECON countries" or just "the Council" are used interchangeably. The terms "COMECON countries," or "Bloc countries" or "Soviet bloc countries" are synonyms; they include the East European countries (for definition see footnote 1) and the Soviet Union.

reject them. The tumultuous events of the year 1956—the Party's Twentieth Congress; the Polish rebellion; and the Hungarian revolution—paralyzed for some time COMECON's activities so that most of the problems of inter-Bloc integration remained in suspense.

After the historical "Declaration of October 30, 1956," in which the Soviet government confessed to past violations of other Bloc members' sovereignty and committed itself to respect their independence and equality in the future, the machinery of COMECON was overhauled and adjusted to these newly stated principles. From then on, the Council's secretariat in Moscow had to share its previously exclusive administrative competence with a number of functional committees established in various capitals of East European countries. Moreover, the principle of voluntarism, practiced but never before formulated in writing, was institutionalized by the acceptance of a charter, which stated that

... All recommendations and decisions in the Council are adopted only with the consent of member-countries concerned, and each country is entitled to state its position on any question studied in the Council. The recommendations and decisions do not concern countries which have abstained on a question. However, each of these countries may subsequently join the other member-countries of the Council which have adopted the recommendations and decisions.⁴

... AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

These reforms within COMECON and the multiplication of its administrative channels—presently there are 22 standing committees in operation scattered all over Eastern Europe—did not increase its operational efficiency. Growing political tensions within the Bloc generated many dissenting opinions in COMECON's meetings and barred agreements even in purely technical matters.

⁴ The English translation of the whole COMECON charter was published in the review *East Europe*, August, 1960. It consists of 17 articles. The above quoted part is from article IV.

⁵ See Frederic L. Pryor, *The Communist Foreign Trade System* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1963), pp. 46–48.

The issue whether national or Bloc interests should be given precedence, when they are in conflict, produced a virtual stalemate in all major matters concerning the coordination of national production plans; of investment projects, of regional (in contrast to merely technical) specialization; and of inter-Bloc trade.

In the early 1960's, a student of East European affairs, in a study devoted to Soviet foreign trade, evaluated COMECON's progress in the tasks that had been assigned to it as follows:⁵

All Comecon nations have had an autarkic pattern of economic growth since the Second World War. . . . this autarkic policy in the East Central European nations has had three adverse consequences: many nations invested in production sectors which were extremely uneconomic; a great deal of parallel investment occurred and each country experienced high costs as well as short production runs; great all-Bloc shortages of certain major products, especially minerals, occurred. . . . Several trends in Bloc production specialization after 1955 are readily observable. Bloc planners seem to be paying much greater attention to the natural resources and factor endowments of the individual nations. . . . Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that this specialization of production did not proceed very far by the end of the 1950s. . . . Many anomalies in the Bloc trade structure still existed. . . . From all this scattered evidence, two main conclusions may be drawn. Most of the Bloc policy makers have not yet made a significant retreat from the old policies of autarky. And most of the far-reaching plans for specialization of Bloc production are still in the discussion rather than operational stage and will remain so for some time.

It might seem surprising that a regime, which never hesitated in the past to pursue its objectives with its well-known ruthlessness, did not succeed for its own and for the Bloc's advantage to use better the possibilities which COMECON offered. One explanation is that perhaps Stalin was so convinced of the Soviet Union's economic self-sufficiency that he completely underestimated the role of the other, smaller countries in the economy of the Soviet bloc; if this was his view, he looked upon COMECON only as a propaganda instrument. Another reason might be that the Politburo men, who held the decision-making

positions, distrusted COMECON's non-political experts when they spoke of benefits of division of labor, of comparative costs, of advantages of specialization, and so forth, and when they used, in their recommendations, arguments resembling various discredited concepts of capitalistic economics. When, in the early 1960's, Khrushchev endorsed these recommendations with his full authority, the political schism in the Bloc was already too advanced and prompted at least one member's resistance to every issue which came before the Council.

The rule of unanimity thus became the Council's most paralyzing stipulation. That this had not been anticipated by COMECON's founders can be explained by the prevailing mood in Moscow under Stalin's rule. It seemed then obviously unthinkable that his authority could ever be challenged in the Council and that a unanimous vote of COMECON's members could ever constitute a problem to the Kremlin's delegates. Thus the principle of voluntarism might have been light-heartedly granted to COMECON's members as a propaganda gimmick since it did not appear to present any threat to Moscow's authority.

KHRUSHCHEV'S GRAND DESIGN

Despairing over COMECON's meager accomplishments and prompted by Western integration reports, Khrushchev, in the summer of 1962, decided to challenge the obstructionists within COMECON to an open showdown. In several articles and speeches, published or delivered that year, he explained what he understood by economic integration of the Bloc:

To see the socialist world economy as a single entity;

to reach an agreement on the policy of creating and utilizing accumulations (understand: capital) on the scale of the Council, first, for the building of common enterprises and, second,

⁶ Condensed from Khrushchev's article in the September, 1962, issue of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* published in Prague. This and all other references to articles and reports of newspapers and periodicals published in countries of the Soviet bloc are based on their German translations which appear regularly in the bi-weekly *Ost-Probleme* printed in Bonn, West Germany.

for national investment plans which would take into account both the national and the common interests;

to decide the trend of specialization in each country, that is, to decide exactly which branches, in what complex, and on what raw material base, should be built in each of the countries in order to meet the common needs most economically;

to provide by this greater international specialization and coordination a sound basis for long-term trade agreements;

to draw up a system which will ensure the transition from bilateral to multilateral planning and regulation of the trade and accounting among the socialist countries.⁶

The first step by which Khrushchev hoped to get his "Grand Design" off the ground was his proposal to establish, within COMECON, an Executive Committee with a rotating chairmanship. This he achieved. The other COMECON members did not see their national interests threatened by the establishment of this new administrative body which, they believed, could not force them, more than the Council itself, into compliance with decisions which they did not approve.

The clash occurred, however, when Khrushchev came out with his proposal for the new body's prerogatives. He wanted it (1) to act as a supranational planning authority, empowered to issue directives to the appropriate planning organs of the member countries, (2) to initiate joint investment projects to develop raw material resources and other economic enterprises on a community-wide basis, (3) to coordinate the investment plans of member countries, which implied the free movement of capital according to the directives of the supranational planning authority.

A fierce conflict developed when the member countries realized that what Khrushchev expected from them was nothing less than the surrender of a certain part of their sovereignty rights to a new supranational agency. They responded at first hesitantly and made various reservations to the proposal. Khrushchev showed willingness to negotiate; yet, before some compromise could be worked out, Rumania rejected flatly all the main points of Khrushchev's proposal and his whole

concept of the economic integration of the Soviet bloc.⁷

Rumania's Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej went even further. He formulated his own "doctrine" about the kind of economic policy he would like to see applied within the Bloc. He declined to accept the idea of a division of labor on a *status quo* basis, because his country, as he put it, must first catch up with other, more industrialized countries of the Bloc (See Rumanian column in section B and F of Table I). Investments, he argued, should not follow only economic considerations. He insisted on Rumania's right to pursue her industrial development in the traditional pattern of national autarchy, rather than in accordance with some Bloc specialization scheme. In opposition to Khrushchev's plea in favor of multilateralism among the Bloc members, Rumania insisted in COMECON's meetings that the coordination of economic plans should be attempted by bilateral consultations between the member countries. She secured support for her view, which was then confirmed by an official communiqué as one of the principles of COMECON's future policy.

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

No doubt the Sino-Soviet conflict helped the Rumanians in their rebellion against Khrushchev's plans. Soon after the publication of Khrushchev's "Grand Design," the Chinese branded it as a form of neo-colonial-

ism and as another demonstration of deviationism from Marx-Leninist principles. This created for the Rumanians an opportunity to draw nearer to China and to Albania with which they even restored their diplomatic relations. When Khrushchev did not succeed in bringing the European members of the Soviet bloc to a common policy declaration toward Peking, he wanted at least to prevent another European country, in addition to Albania, from joining openly Peking's group against him. This is why Khrushchev retreated from the main ideas of his integration scheme. With some concessions, he could have probably won for the plan the support of the more industrialized countries of the Bloc—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and possibly even Hungary. These countries are trying now to salvage at least parts of the plan by creating supranational managements for some of their existing enterprises in specific lines of production as, for example, steel rolling mills, and ball-bearing plants.

AN OPEN DIALOGUE

In the early 1960's, the reduced rate of growth of all Bloc economies (see section E, Table I) and their more frequently reappearing internal disproportions—critical shortages of some product components, accumulated stocks of other components of the same product, unsalable quantities of certain consumer goods and permanent inavailability of others—prompted professional economists to examine the system and to trace the causes of its difficulties and failures. In their reports, which were published and openly discussed, one could find, sometimes under modified terms, many familiar and correctly applied concepts of economic analysis.

TABOO DOCTRINES

Sometimes only a few scattered cliché adjectives from the Bloc's political lingo reminded the reader that the author of the text must have been someone from the Soviet bloc.⁸ Some authors did not even hesitate to discuss certain beliefs which had been taboo for many years (such as the dogma of

⁷ A detailed account of this conflict can be found in J. B. Thompson's article "Rumania's Struggle with COMECON" in the June, 1964, issue of *East Europe*. Other sources of information, on which this summary of the 1962–1964 events within the COMECON family is based, are the following: "COMECON 1949–1963: Realitäten und Probleme," and "COMECON 1964: Krise der Zusammenarbeit" in *Ost-Probleme*, July 24, 1964, Vol. 16, No. 15; Michael Gamarnikow, "COMECON Today," *East Europe*, March, 1964, Vol. 13, No. 3; R. S. Jaster, "The Defeat of Khrushchev's Plan to Integrate Eastern Europe," *World Today*, December, 1963, Vol. 19, No. 12; and Piotr Jarosiewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid—an instrument of Cooperation between Socialist Countries," *World Marxist Review*, March, 1964, Vol. 7, No. 3.

⁸ The following are some examples of such over-used cliché expressions: Bloc countries are "brotherly" or "fraternal," financial aid among them is "comradely," era of liberalism is "rotten."

EASTERN EUROPE IN LIGHT OF SOVIET STATISTICS

	Unit	Year of Reference	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	U.S.S.R.
A. Area	square km.								
	(thousand)		111	128	108	93	312	237	22,400
Population ¹	million	1961/3	8.0	13.8	17.1	10.1	30.5	18.6	223.1
B. Contributions to national income:	% of the total national income								
by industry		1961	46.2	62.0	63.7	56.7	48.3	45.8	51.8
by construction	"	"	7.5	10.0	6.2	10.9	8.8	8.9	9.8
by farming and forestry	"	"	31.6	15.0	11.2	23.1	26.0	31.1	21.2
by transportation and communication	"	"	4.3	4.0	4.8	4.2	6.7	3.7	5.6
by trade	"	"	8.6	6.0	7.1	4.4	9.1	6.9	11.6
by miscellaneous	"	"	1.8	3.0	7.0	.7	1.1	3.6	—
C. Share of the socialistic sector:	% of								
in industry	gross output	1961/2	99.2	100.0	88.4	97.5	99.4	99.0	100.0
in farming	acreage in use	"	98.2	88.6	93.2	95.6	13.6	84.5	99.9
in retail trade	turnover ²	"	99.9	100.0	78.0	98.8	97.8	100.0	100.0
D. Output of:									
steel	million tons	1963	.5	7.6	4.1	2.4	8.0	2.7	80.2
electricity	billion kwh	1962	6.0	28.7	45.1	9.1	35.4	10.1	369.0
E. Growth of industrial production	average % per year	1951/62 period	14.2	10.4	10.5	10.1	12.3	13.3	11.4
	% of 1961	1962	11.1	6.0	6.1	9.0	8.4	14.7	9.5
	% of 1962	1963	10.0	.4	4.9	7.0	5.3	12.2	8.5
F. Level of industrial development:	Poland's ratio of 1961 = 100								
industrial output per capita		1961	52	191	185	83	100	67	n.a.

(1) Population of all COMECON countries (total of the above line): 321.1 million.

Population of all COMECON countries without U.S.S.R.: 98.1 million.

Population of the latter group plus Yugoslavia (18.8) and Albania (1.7): 118.6 million.

(2) Assumed—original does not indicate unit.

Sources: This table was prepared by the author; it is based on statistical material published in various 1963 and 1964 issues of the following periodicals: *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), *Probleme Des Friedens Und Des Sozialismus* (East Berlin), *Ost-Probleme* (Bonn), and *East Europe* (New York).

priority for the production of capital goods or the cult of planning).⁹

At the same time, all countries of the Eastern bloc were selectively introducing various innovations by which they were attempting to improve, in one way or another, the system's operation. Thus Walter Ulbricht, in East Germany, challenged the managers of industrial key enterprises to apply the yardstick of profitability to all spheres of their activities, regardless of all difficulties which they might encounter "even if they are created by obsolete management methods of higher agencies." Janos Kadar, in Hungary, reintroduced the rate of interest on fixed and working capital into the accounts of industrial enterprises and recognized more plainly than in any other country of the Soviet bloc that capital has a value and that interest has an important function in the control of capital investments.

Wladyslaw Gomulka, in Poland, gave his sanction to profit-sharing experiments in fine mechanics plants and to privately conducted exports of the country's steel mills; he also approved the conversion of the state-owned merchant marine into commercially operated units. And even the slow-moving Antonin Novotny, in Czechoslovakia, reopened some possibilities to private entrepreneurs in small service and crafts establishments.

In 1964, all countries of Eastern Europe appeared to be more independent in their economic relations with Western and other non-Bloc countries. In 1957, Poland was the first country of the Bloc that broke the rule against separate dealings on the part of in-

dividual Bloc members with the non-Soviet world, when she received the first United States credit for her commodity imports. In the following years, other Bloc countries made individual trade and credit arrangements with Western countries. In spite of political tension between them and the government in Bonn, one after another, they established permanent trade missions in Western Germany. In 1964, Rumania secured access to Western petroleum extracting and processing technology by contracts and credit arrangements with French, British and United States firms.

At the United Nations trade conference held in Geneva in the spring of 1964, in which delegations from 122 countries participated, the Soviet Union, like other great powers, made a general policy statement. Unlike similar occasions in the past, this statement was endorsed by only two Communist Bloc countries—East Germany and Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet Union was sharply attacking some of the existing international institutions—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (which Khrushchev dubbed the "neo-colonial fund")—three of her other Bloc partners—Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria—were at the same time applying for admission into these institutions.

An economist who specializes in Soviet-bloc affairs, Michael Gamarnikow, recently analyzed the trends of economic revisionism in Eastern Europe, country by country. His well-documented study of the open controversy between the academicians and the dogmatic partymen was concluded by the following prediction of developments in the area:¹⁰

"... Rational economic thinking is still faced with stiff resistance from dogmatic elements among the powerful. Nevertheless, the ideas of economic pragmatism are gradually gaining ground—both as theoretical formulations and in the form of practical experiments. The general over-all trend of revisionist thinking leads clearly toward a market economy coupled with some sort of economic planning. . . . Such systems can be worked out only by the new generation of economists and technocrats, who are

⁹ The range of discussed topics and defended opinions can be seen from the following few titles selected out of many articles by Bloc economists: Y. G. Liberman, "The Plans, Profits, and Premiums," *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1962; E. Loeb, "On Dogmatism in Economic Thinking," *Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava) Sept. 28, Oct. 5, Oct. 12, 1963; Ota Sik, "The Survivals of Dogmatism in Political Economy Must Be Overcome," *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 9, 1963; also, "On the Levy to be Paid by Enterprises on Fixed and Working Capital," *Figyelo* (Budapest), January 1, 1964; and Milosevsky, "On the Question of Strengthening Economic Incentives in Our Country," *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), November, 1963.

¹⁰ Michael Gamarnikow, "The Growth of Economic Revisionism," *East Europe*, May and July, 1964, Vol. 13, No. 5 and 7.

much more rational in their thinking than the old cadres of Party leaders. . . . In the long run, this young élite can be expected to generate enough pressure to force through the necessary reforms both in economic theory and in methods of planning and managing the national economy. . . ."

A NEW CHANCE

After such virulent earthquakes every eight years—Yugoslavia in 1948, Hungary in 1956, Rumania in 1964—one must wonder how much internal cohesion still exists in what once was called the Soviet East European empire. De-Stalinization assumed there the forms of de-satellization. Colonialism is definitely on its way out—this time in East Europe also. While much is still to be accomplished to assure personal freedom and the right to the pursuit of happiness—to use the Jeffersonian phrase—which are standard attributes of citizenship in the Western World, the display of independent actions made recently by various East European governments has been truly amazing.

It would, however, be a tragic mistake if the East European countries now turned away from every idea which once came from, or was supported by, the Moscow regime. They would act against their peoples' interests if they used the COMECON platform only for technical agreements (as for instance, those concerning the inter-Bloc oil-pipeline and the clearing center for inter-Bloc payments), and refused to use it for the coordination of their economic policies. They would slow down, not accelerate, the material advancement of their people if, to reassert their national traditions, they returned to the policy of economic autarchy of the inter-war years—a policy which the Gheorghiu-Dej regime in Rumania seems to have now chosen. Limitations imposed on individual countries of Eastern Europe by the hard facts of geography, of modern technology, and the laws of economics remain valid regardless of the power Bloc with which their territories are associated.

In 1918, the East Europeans lost the base from which they had the best chance to catch up with the West. Unaware of the

value of a big natural market in the era of low-cost mass production, which was then just beginning, they traded their common market for the satisfaction of their national grievances against an archaic and too centralized administration. The price that they paid for this achievement in terms of lost earning opportunities was enormous. It was out of any proportion to the benefits that they received from it: 20 years of mixed democratic freedom and of semi-colonial economic independence (which they neglected to use to mutual material advantage); and then, another 20 or more years of foreign occupation, national humiliation, economic exploitation and overall frustration.

In contrast to 1918, the East Europeans are today richer by two experiences. One experiment, to which they themselves were subjected, illustrated dramatically how relative and elusive for a small nation is the concept of national sovereignty; the second experiment, which was made in the West, demonstrated convincingly the high value of a big common market for the attainment and growth of a widespread prosperity. Without a voluntary surrender of certain national prerogatives, the European Economic Community would never have become a reality in the West.

Should the governments of Eastern Europe, with the return of their freedom of action, neglect to draw a lesson from these two experiences and should they resume their attempts to build, each one separately, a "solid" industrial national base instead of coordinating their policies to build a strong East European commonwealth, they are bound to repeat, once more, the mistake of 1918.

Vaclav E. Mares, a native of Czechoslovakia, came to the United States after World War II. In 1948, he joined the faculty of the Pennsylvania State University. In the spring and summer of 1963, he directed the Penn State Study Program at the University of Strasbourg, France, and participated in the summer program arranged there for the Free Europe Scholarship students.

Giving an insight into the present Soviet image of the West, this specialist points out that in recent Soviet statements there are "atypical signs of flexibility and a preoccupation with empirical data. Though presented within the general framework of accepted Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they nonetheless reflect the operation of a dynamic process of rethinking long accepted assumptions that might give rise to a greater degree of realism in Soviet attitudes toward the West and might lead to the shedding of some of the 'myths and illusions' that have long clouded Soviet thinking."

The Soviet Image of Western Europe

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THE RECENT SIGNS of a relaxation in Soviet-United States relations justify a certain cautious optimism over the possibility of further improvement in relations between the two countries. But they should not occasion any wishful or uncritical thinking about the allegedly changing character of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Just as it is important not to overlook any area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union, so, too, it is essential that we not ignore those Soviet policies and perceptions that were and still are at the heart of the cold war. These policies have not been abandoned; nor is there evidence that the distorted Soviet perceptions of the West, which are in considerable measure responsible for Moscow's hostile policies, have been discarded in favor of more realistic ones. Nowhere is this more apparent than in official Soviet analyses of developments in Western Europe.

In the Soviet Union, scholarly writings, particularly on international affairs, must conform to whatever is at any given time the official Party position. Thus, though they afford no insights into the process by which new policies are adopted, they mirror existing official attitudes toward major contemporary international problems, and serve as useful guides to current Soviet thinking.

If the amount of attention given by Soviet scholars is a valid index of official interest, then Western Europe must be viewed as the key non-Communist area of Kremlin concern. Not only is more attention devoted to Western European developments than to those of any other area, but the treatment of them since 1953 is a convincing manifestation of continuity in Soviet policy and objectives. Opposition to NATO, to United States bases in Europe, to the remilitarization of West Germany, and to all moves designed to advance Western European unity, remains, as in Stalin's day, a constant of Soviet commentaries. The flexibility and occasional ingenuity displayed in Soviet diplomacy elsewhere is not apparent in Europe, where policy clearly reflects the adage—*plus ça change, plus ça reste la meme*.

1. *NATO*: Soviet writers regard NATO as an aggressive military bloc dominated by the United States. However, they recognize, and act on the knowledge, that there is no single view, accepted by all NATO members, concerning relations with the Soviet camp, the role of West Germany in the alliance, the sharing of nuclear weapons, or the future of NATO. They exploit existing differences, particularly between France and Germany, and between France, on the one hand, and

the United States and Britain, on the other. NATO's inability to resolve basic policy disagreements and agree on a common policy covering the spectrum of NATO concerns is grist for their mill. These dissonances may serve to encrust still further the Soviet belief in the divisive potential of the "contradictions" of capitalism and the attendant possibility of a NATO split, and lead Moscow to act as if conflicts were permanent features of intra-Western political and economic relationships. Thus, ideological conceptualizations are reinforced by observable political phenomena, and *vice versa*.

Soviet scholars are remarkably conversant with Western literature on NATO and its problems. They carefully follow the Western dialogue over NATO's present dilemmas and proposals for its future. One Soviet writer, commenting on intra-NATO differences and the efforts being taken to restore a measure of unity to the alliance, has held that the new proposals are primarily designed to entrench the leading position of the United States, and that the only difference is the increased attention being given to strengthening political and economic relations, as a precondition for military viability. Another commentator has attributed NATO's disunity to the "struggle for a reassignment of political roles among the Western countries" and the reluctance of the United States to relinquish its dominant position. He has noted further that:

Britain . . . is determined not to relax her grip on the second place. . . . Hence Britain's guarded attitude towards France and West Germany which are laying claim more and more openly to the position of chief partner of the United States and to the status of leading Powers in capitalist Europe.¹

The Bonn-Washington clique within NATO is a recurrent theme. Soviet writers

purport to see in this a growing danger of war, as Bonn and Washington, each for reasons of its own, become more belligerent on the matter of negotiating the critical questions of Berlin and German reunification. In this respect, the proposals for providing NATO with a nuclear capability have been denounced by the Soviets as a "plan for giving the West German revanchists weapons of mass destruction." In particular, Soviet criticism has focussed on the United States proposal for a multilateral-nuclear-force (M.L.F.), which is designed to organize a fleet of surface ships, armed with nuclear weapons and polaris missiles, and manned by integrated crews from participating NATO nations. Citing the widespread opposition of the French and the British to the M.L.F. proposal, one Soviet analyst has held that "only West Germany was really interested in the United States proposal: she saw in it a chance to get direct control over nuclear weapons and hopes quite reasonably that once she has a finger on the nuclear trigger, she will be able to get a firm grip on the whole."²

2. *The German Problem.* Perhaps the foremost of NATO problems attracting Soviet attention is that of Germany. The remilitarization of West Germany is the cause of constant Soviet concern. Ten years ago, a Soviet article in *Kommunist*, the authoritative Party journal, insisted that the United States, to help realize its "aggressive plans," needed "a powerful, well-trained land army in Europe equipped with the latest weapons," and, accordingly, initiated German remilitarization in order to make West Germany into "an obedient instrument of its aggressive policy, into a mailed fist that would be directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies and at the same time be used to subject NATO to United States control."³ This Soviet interpretation has not changed.

The Paris Agreements of 1954, which brought West Germany into NATO and sanctioned its rearmament, were bitterly attacked. Soviet commentaries geared specific articles to selected target audiences, seeking to exploit every possible objection: Europe's deep-rooted fear of German militarism and a

¹ A. Galkin, "The Knot of Contradictions in Western Europe," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8 (August, 1959), p. 44.

² F. Fyodorov, "NATO and the Demand of the Times," *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 40.

³ I. Yevgenov, "Re-establishment of Militarism in West Germany—A Threat to European Security," *Kommunist*, No. 11 (July, 1954), pp. 104-105.

possible recrudescence of Nazism; the likelihood of a strong Germany leading NATO into war to recover the "Eastern territories"; the growing economic power of West Germany, which increasingly would compete with Britain and France in the latter's traditional markets; the understandable improbability of the U.S.S.R. permitting reunification of a Germany allied with NATO; and the omnipresent danger that German rearmament represented for all "peace-loving" Europeans.

The Soviets have insisted that the Paris Agreements and the subsequent integration of West Germany into NATO complicated the task of finding a solution to the German question. They argue that if Germany is to be united, then it must not be a member of any bloc; indeed, that Western incorporation of West Germany into NATO shows that the "ruling circles in the United States, Britain and France" have no genuine interest in unification. Many articles have been published by the Soviets stressing to the Bonn Government the incompatibility between its membership in NATO and its prospects of attaining unification.

Since 1958, Soviet apprehensions have heightened, as the likelihood of West Germany obtaining missiles and nuclear weapons has (to Moscow, at any rate) seemingly increased. Soviet writers have noted that Bonn, eager to build up the German army for "revanchist" reasons, was also beginning to use its growing economic strength to exact political concessions from other NATO members. Thus, they blamed West Germany for NATO's rejection of the Rapacki Plan, a proposal to create an atom-free zone in Central Europe. More recently, they have cast West Germany as the chief obstructionist element working against a further improvement of United States-Soviet relations.

On the one hand, Soviet writers state that Bonn realizes it can never expect to play the dominant role in European politics that it once did under Hitler and the Kaiser; on the other hand, they qualify this statement by

observing that "perspicacity and foresight in politics have seldom been strong points of German imperialism's leaders," the present group of whom still hope to obtain a leading position in NATO, and through it, in world politics.⁴

Permeating all Soviet commentaries is an apparent uneasiness over German rearmament and a willingness to negotiate to decelerate this development. But Soviet terms remain unacceptable to the West: i.e., Western recognition of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe and the Eastern frontiers of Germany; a neutralized Germany; and a virtual dismantling of NATO. In general, Soviet writings on the German question are strident and heavily ideological in character.

3. *France: Problem and Paradox.* Soviet writers regard France as the "Achilles Heel" of NATO. Sensing NATO's vulnerability here, they concentrate considerable effort on French politics. Their themes are the "constants" of the contemporary scene: traditional French fear of Germany, the Adenauer-de Gaulle rapprochement notwithstanding [note: since Ludwig Erhard's accession to the German chancellorship in 1963, the Soviets have intensified their emphasis on the differences that exist between Bonn and Paris]; growing French dissatisfaction with the structure of NATO; and Charles de Gaulle's conception of a Europe of cooperating but independent "sovereignties," which conflicts with United States and British proposals for a more politically and militarily integrated "Atlantic Community." Emphasis on particular issues varies according to the international political climate. Soviet scholars have also written extensively on two other topics: the periodic calls for a revival of the Franco-Russian alliance against the threat of an aggressive Germany; and the dilemma which de Gaulle presents for the Soviets.

For example, during Premier Khrushchev's visit to France in March, 1960, Soviet writers lauded "the long-standing and durable traditions" of Franco-Russian friendship. They noted that both de Gaulle and Khrushchev were realists; that both knew that war can no longer serve as a means of resolving interna-

⁴ V. Petrov, "Of Those Who Crave for Revenge," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March, 1964), p. 11.

tional disputes. De Gaulle's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary [between East Germany and Poland] was warmly received.

Today, the Soviets acknowledge that a "genuine" Franco-German rapprochement would be a good thing, but insist that "Bonn's flirting with France is only a cloak for its policy of rebuilding the aggressive might of German militarism." They write approvingly of France's dispute with its NATO partners and support enthusiastically a vigorous French nationalism: "A powerful France holds no menace for the Soviet Union or its interests. On the contrary, the more France asserts her great-power independence, the easier it will be for us to work in common for solution of the pressing problems of Europe and the world."

This courtship of France, however, has frequently foundered on Moscow's ambivalence toward de Gaulle. When de Gaulle came to power in 1958, Moscow attacked him for seeking to establish a military dictatorship and for continuing the war in Algeria. Two years later it lauded him for liquidating the struggle there and for granting Algeria independence. Moscow reacts favorably to de Gaulle's efforts to obtain a position of leadership for France in NATO, but it condemns his efforts to provide France with an independent nuclear capability and his unwillingness to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. The Soviet government approves of France's opposition to the establishment of a multilateral-nuclear-force for NATO, but it disapproves of France's nuclear pretensions.

When de Gaulle vetoed Great Britain's application for membership in the Common Market in January, 1963, Moscow was elated, for it interpreted the move as an indication that "unity" could not be achieved by capitalist states. But of all the Western leaders, de Gaulle is the most obstinate in opposing discussions with Moscow over Berlin and a German peace treaty as long as the Soviets persist in bringing pressure to bear in these critical areas. The French-West German Treaty of Cooperation, signed in Paris on January 22, 1963, has come in for bitter Soviet criticism: "... the first French-West Ger-

man treaty of alliance reeks of gunpowder and field hospitals. It is nothing but a militaristic two-power bloc within the 15-nation military bloc." Moscow purports to see in the treaty a scarcely veiled encouragement to German military and "revanchist" ambitions. Paris has scoffed at Soviet objections and rejected all official protests.

The Soviets view de Gaulle with a mixture of respect and bewilderment (similar to that one finds prevalent in Western capitals). Moscow's desires for better relations with Paris is evident. In early March of 1964 Nikolai Podgorny, a ranking member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist party, headed a Soviet goodwill mission to France. He is reported to have extended an invitation from Khrushchev to de Gaulle to visit the Soviet Union. Several weeks later, Alexei I. Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestiia* (the official paper of the Soviet Government) and the son-in-law of Khrushchev, also visited France, ostensibly to conclude a cultural exchange agreement but also probably to improve political relations between Moscow and Paris.

4. *The Soviet Response to "European Unity."* Continuity with the Stalin era also finds expression in the unremitting hostility toward all efforts designed to promote Western unity through supranational or inter-governmental institutions, e.g., the Common Market, Euratom, and the Council of Europe. In the January, 1954, issue of *Kommunist*, S. Beglev compared "the present attempts of the Western powers to unite Europe with the attempts of Hitler to unify Europe against the USSR." He held that "European union leads to increasing tensions in international relations and threatens the peace of Europe" and attacked the ideology of European Union as inherently antinational in character. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union, which has long been viewed with suspicion, in part, because of its "internationalism," is in the forefront of those who defend "nationalism" and "national sovereignty" as the highest of political values.

Intransigence on this issue can perhaps best be explained in terms of Moscow's overriding preoccupation with the prevention of West

German integration—politically, economically and militarily—with Western Europe. For the Soviets, plans for European unity are indivisibly linked with “the rebirth of German militarism”; and Moscow may well fear Europe’s effective integration because of its persistent and understandable fear that such a Europe might be dominated by a militantly-minded Germany.

The first significant postwar success in promoting European economic integration was the European Coal and Steel Community (1950). The 1960 edition of the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary described this as “a closed inter-governmental monopolistic organization . . . initiated by the ruling class of the United States . . . to answer the needs of the war policies of the Western states.” One Soviet writer maintained that “the basic aim of the initiators of E.C.S.C. is to lay a sound economic foundation for NATO’s European army and the West German armed forces.”⁵ Others asserted that the principal beneficiaries have been the West German “monopolists”; while admitting that some members have also experienced “limited successes in trade and development,” they argued that the less developed countries did not fare so well as the developed ones and that the United States has used the E.C.S.C. to accelerate the industrial development of a closely allied, rearmed West Germany.

NATO’s growing disunity is cited as the reason why the United States and its apologists have turned to the concept of “Atlantic Community.” The Soviets say that the United States seeks to divert attention from the purely military character of NATO and to mask it with “some ideals.” They deride the “NATO sophists” who insist that military and nuclear technology have made traditional concepts of national sovereignty obsolete, and that modern weapons systems necessitate “political integration.” Permeating all these Soviet analyses is the spectre of West German domination, with United States support, of any European federation.

On another level, the Soviets denounce the

idea of a United Europe as just another scheme for imperialist “peaceful” division of world markets. Thus, they give increasing attention to “Eurafrica projects,” which are described as attempts by Western European monopolies to mitigate their rivalries in Europe by cooperating to bring African markets within their economic orbit and, in the process, to promote European influence in the newly-independent African countries.

Of the various aspects of West European integration none has been accorded more detailed and searching analysis than the Common Market. At the time of the signing of the Rome Agreement (March 25, 1957), which established the European Economic Community (Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the editors of *International Affairs* (Moscow), the principal journal of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published an abridged text of the Agreement and made the following points: First, since all signatories are members of NATO, it is clear “that in practice the European Economic Community will be subordinated to the aims of that aggressive military bloc, in which the predominant role is played by the United States.” Second, the treaty is an attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of the countries concerned, and particularly of France and West Germany. However, it is the West German monopolies which will gain most, as the experience of the European Coal and Steel Community indicates. Finally, the Common Market will strengthen Germany’s role in West Europe, thus encouraging it to press forward with its *revanchist* objectives.

These initial Soviet views were elaborated at a seminar held in Prague in July, 1957, for the Soviet bloc countries, under the auspices of the *World Marxist Review*, the “unofficial” official journal of the Moscow-oriented international Communist movement.

According to A. Arzumanyan, the Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, the Common Market is part of a comprehensive effort “to buttress capitalism’s economic position at one of its weaker spots—Western Europe.” It seeks to

⁵ I. Chelnokov, “The European Coal and Steel Community,” *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February, 1957), p. 95.

link economic integration with the existing pattern of military and political alliances, the overall objective being a concerted attack on the "socialist countries," as well as against "the democratic forces in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement in the colonies of the Western European powers." Arzumanyan held that each of the powers has a vital stake in the Common Market (and related plans):

Adenauer views it as a means of protecting German imperialism from German socialism, de Gaulle looks on it as a means of consolidating the reactionary regime in France and of solving her colonial problems, while Italy's Christian-Democratic party considers it a safeguard against the left. All of them, jointly with the United States, seek to "protect" imperialism from communism through the Common Market.⁶

After cataloging the "contradictions of capitalism" which precluded, said Arzumanyan, any prospect of genuine success for the Common Market or its companion integrative plans, he added a cautionary note to the effect that "European 'integration' is a factor to be reckoned with."

Some years later, in August, 1962, a special meeting of Soviet and foreign Communist scholars met in Moscow to discuss the challenge of the Common Market, which (contrary to Soviet expectations) was becoming a more and more potent economic and political force in world politics. Two important documents were issued which indicated that the Soviet leaders were adopting a more flexible view of the situation in Western Europe and that differences very possibly existed among Soviet specialists over the significance and stability of the Common Market.

The themes of these documents—that the Common Market has brought about an accelerated rate of economic growth and an unexpected stability to the member countries—have been developed further in later Soviet statements. Throughout the recent com-

mentaries there are atypical signs of flexibility and a preoccupation with empirical data. Though presented within the general framework of accepted Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they nonetheless reflect the operation of a dynamic process of rethinking long accepted assumptions that might give rise to a greater degree of realism in Soviet attitudes toward the West and might lead to the shedding of some of the "myths and illusions" that have long clouded Soviet thinking. Marshall D. Shulman, in his article on the impact of the Common Market on Soviet thinking, noted that:

Behind the stereotyped formulations of the written statements, only a hint remains of the range and flexibility of the oral discussions that must have preceded the act of writing; surely it would be an error to take the printed documents as representing the full range of sophistication among Soviet students of Western economics. Even so, the printed record of the discussion of the ideological aspect of Western integration bespeaks at least a growing potentiality for decisive adjustments to bring Soviet ideology into closer accord with reality. To the extent that events continue to evoke these adjustments, a major source of conflict between the Soviet Union and states that do not accept the same premises about the future will be moderated.⁷

Until recently, Western European developments were the area of Soviet scholarship most impervious to modification. The ten-

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⁶ A. Arzumanyan, "Socio-Economic and Political Background to West European 'Integration,'" *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (October, 1959), p. 69.

⁷ Marshall D. Shulman, "The Communist States and Western Integration," *International Organization*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (1963), pp. 657–658.

"A force outside Moscow's control opened the new phase of Communist penetration in Latin America," observes this specialist, who points out that although the Soviet Union was for a long while indifferent to Latin America, its overall attitude has now changed.

Soviet Policies in Latin America

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The national liberation struggle sweeping across Asia, Africa and Latin America as a single, common mass movement has been a standard image of Communist propaganda. Only in 1956 did Soviet analyses recognize political and social distinctions between the independence movements in Africa and those in Asia. The Latin American anti-imperialist movement, however, remained indistinct and undistinguished in Communist eyes, vaguely appended to the movements in Asia and Africa.

The only special feature of Latin America derived from its much longer period of formal

political independence and the resulting vacillation of its national bourgeoisie. Consequently it would be wrong, the analyses concluded, "to anticipate that the national bourgeoisie will bring the liberation movement in Latin America to a victorious end and ensure the independent development of these countries."¹ Latin America's special revolutionary potential was overlooked. The disillusionment of its large worker and urban population in political independence after the failure of numerous revolutions, constitutions and *coups d'état* was ignored. The tight grip of United States neo-colonialism appeared in Soviet propaganda to be almost impregnable. It was one thing to disrupt the crumbling empires of Britain, France and Belgium, but another matter to penetrate the Monroe Doctrine of the number one imperialist power. Latin America could be left until later.

More important, the masses of Latin America had refused to develop along prescribed Marxian lines. They lacked the proper self-consciousness and self-interest and were easily and frequently manipulated by demagogues accepting *coups d'état* as the order of the day. Furthermore, the complexity of social, racial and political cleavages defied any attempts to unify the masses. Against this disorganization the Communist parties had made only slight headway, and their following in most countries of Latin America has remained minimal.² Communist efforts to infiltrate the trade unions rarely succeeded³ and even the

¹ Pedro Reyes, "Some Aspects of the Liberation Movement in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, II, 1 (January, 1959), pp. 39-40. See also Rodney-Arismendi, "On the Role of the National Bourgeoisie in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle (A Study of the Liberation Movement in Latin America)," Part I in *ibid.*, II, 5 (May, 1959), pp. 29-39; Part II in *ibid.*, II, 6 (June, 1959), pp. 31-37.

² For example, in 1959, the resolution of the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist Party declared, "... the Party is experiencing a prolonged crisis (since 1937) and ... despite the favorable conditions in the country, it has become isolated from the masses, has lost a considerable part of its influence and has become weaker organizationally," *ibid.*, II, 12 (December, 1959), pp. 48-51.

³ "In the past the Communists in Brazil adopted a wrong attitude toward the trade unions. Since the unions were run by employers and the Ministry of Labor and headed by their stooges, the Communists abandoned all work in the unions. An attempt to establish parallel unions proved for the most part ineffective. The outcome was that the Communists found themselves cut off from the working masses and their influence declined." Antonio Santos, "Overcoming Sectarian Errors," *ibid.*, II, 11 (November, 1959), pp. 58-59.

less ambitious task of unifying the unions around a popular front leadership within each country and throughout Latin America failed completely.⁴

The fundamental problem of the Communists was an inability to be accepted as a legitimate form of opposition by the workers and intellectuals (they had largely ignored the peasantry). Not only were they unable to overcome the stigma of being labeled as a foreign influence, they failed to provide their own demagogic leadership or compete against that of other groups. The firm attitude of the church, which still has a powerful hold over some sections of the masses, was an additional hurdle.

Although the Communists are without a mass base, nevertheless, they constitute a minority political force on the fringe of the political spectrum and in some countries, such as Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, they represent a faction of some consequence. In most cases, they achieved their position by carefully nurtured alliances, shunning the use of force and guerrilla warfare for fear of being reduced to a state of banditry. Their alliances have reached far and wide and not infrequently have been with right-wing, fascist-type groups. The Communist party of Cuba, for example, owed its standing to a cooperative arrangement with Batista. The Argentine Communists for several years have openly supported

the Peronistas. The Argentine case is unusual, however, because most of the so-called "black" Communist arrangements are not publicized.⁵ The Communists prefer and generally acknowledge arrangements only with other leftist groups. In recent years their most important achievement along this line has been the Popular Front (*Frente de Accion Popular*) in Chile.

In spite of the Soviet Union's new interest in the underdeveloped countries beginning in 1955-1956, the role of Communist parties did not change. In fact, there was a conscious effort to play down the role of the parties, and the main thrust of the new strategy was the Soviet government's offer of diplomatic relations, trade and aid to the new and old governments of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since few Latin American governments responded, there was little increase in Soviet influence in the initial phases of the new strategy.

CASTRO SHOWS THE WAY

A force outside Moscow's control opened the new phase of Communist penetration in Latin America. This was the anti-Yankee, pro-Communist development of the Cuban revolution, which first shattered the illusion of the United States' monopoly position in the Western Hemisphere. The ease with which Castro defeated military dictatorship in one of the most prosperous countries of Latin America and subsequently defied the United States dramatized the revolutionary potential of Latin America.

Castro's charisma swept Latin America like a brush fire, its flame exploding the dry tinder of years of disillusionment and despair. Castro's message, and theme, was victory through guerrilla warfare. It is unnecessary, he declared, to wait for mass support, this can be created along with the guerrilla army out of the struggle itself.⁶ By Soviet standards, such a strategy was sheer "adventurism," but Castro's appeal could not be ignored.

Castro's initial governmental program was very mild, proposing to restore the constitution of 1940 and call for free elections. But such objectives neither fitted Castro's personal

⁴ For example, the attempts to hold conferences to organize a single Latin American trade union federation in Bolivia in October, 1961, and in Santiago, Chile in September, 1962, both failed.

⁵ However, a forthright statement of this opportunistic policy in respect to Venezuela appeared in "Call to Unity," *ibid.*, III, 8 (August, 1960) pp. 47-48: "We know it is impossible to divide the forces into Left and Right. In the present situation, to make this arbitrary division would restrict our policy of alliances. . . ."

⁶ "We hold that in the current situation in America the Cuban revolution has made three basic contributions to the revolutionary movement there. They are: firstly, that it is possible for the people's force to win victory over reactionary troops. Secondly, that we ought not wait for all the revolutionary conditions to become ripe, and that the centre of the uprising can create such revolutionary conditions. Thirdly, that in the underdeveloped parts of America, the battlefield for armed struggle should generally be in the villages." Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 1959, cited in *Peking Review*, no. 2 (January 10, 1964), p. 15.

ambitions nor seemed consistent with the dynamism of his appeal and success. Thus, there followed his well publicized and planned conversion to communism in 1959. Communism provided a ready-made utopian program and would hopefully lead to a source of economic and military aid. At the same time, an alliance of the Fidelistas and the Communists would help spread the fire of revolt and be a decisive blow against the United States. Within Cuba, Castro looked upon the small but well organized Cuban Communist party as an instrument to purge his following of revolutionary idealists who had outlived their usefulness and as a core for his own monolithic party.

Castro did not consider his acceptance into the Communist bloc as a surrender but as the means to strengthen his position. His admittance was to be on his own terms which included (1) Soviet acknowledgement of Cuba's own road to socialism under his exclusive leadership and (2) a predominant influence for himself and his tactics in Latin America.⁷ Under this arrangement, Cuba, with Soviet material backing, would train revolutionaries in guerrilla tactics, and export them to Latin America and elsewhere to foment Cuban-type revolutions. The resulting increase of revolutionary activity and the joint defiance of the United States allegedly would be central to both of their interests.

U.S.S.R. RESISTS CUBA'S ADMISSION

On the one hand, Castro was not wrong in his analysis; such an arrangement offered important advantages to the U.S.S.R., although perhaps not so central to its interests as Castro thought. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership had some serious doubts as to where it might lead in the future. The Cuban situation certainly offered a chance to influence and perhaps control a genuine, successful revolution to the left, which had continental appeal. Even more important from

⁷ The reasons for the purge of Escalante, a veteran Communist, by Castro in March, 1962, is obscure, especially since he was the only top Communist to be removed. It may be that Castro wanted to show the U.S.S.R. his strength and prove that his continued control over his internal organization could not be questioned.

the U.S.S.R.'s national point of view, it was a serious check on United States hegemony and prestige in the Western Hemisphere.

But the alliance also presented certain problems. Could the U.S.S.R. contain Castro's ambitions? How far would he embroil the U.S.S.R. in Latin America and at what cost? Furthermore, to adopt Castro's tactics would be an abrupt shift to "*putschism*" and "adventurism," policies denounced by Lenin and Stalin and condemned by Khrushchev as inapplicable in the nuclear age. Among the Communist parties of Latin America, opposition to Castro's tactics was also strong; they were reluctant to endanger their precarious status by taking up arms. Furthermore, they had done little work among the peasantry on which to base a guerrilla force.

As protector of the faith the Soviet Union was also concerned by the precedent set in taking Cuba into the socialist bloc at such an early stage in its revolution. It is true that Khrushchev had opened the way when he suggested that even the national bourgeoisie in alliance with the Soviet bloc could lead a new nation to socialism, but this theme had been very short-lived and had already been dropped from Soviet propaganda.

Nevertheless, the pressures on the Soviet Union to accept Cuba continued to mount. Castro persistently pounded at the gates and asked the U.S.S.R., as the self-proclaimed leader of world revolution, to assume its responsibility. At the same time, Castro carefully nurtured his ideological and trade relations with China and avoided committing himself to either side in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. Exchange of delegations between Cuba and China became frequent, China was more than willing to be used as Cuba's advocate. Both the success of the Cuban revolution and its strategy appealed to the Chinese leadership as the only way to defeat United States imperialism. Castro's Second Havana Declaration of February, 1962, maximizing the use of force, was particularly to the Chinese liking and became a frequently quoted document in Chinese propaganda. During the wooing period, however, the Chinese were very careful not

to take an independent line and stood aside waiting and urging the U.S.S.R. to take the first plunge.

SOVIET COMMITMENT

The Soviet leaders resisted Castro's pressure for two years, partly because the development from semi-feudalism to socialism could not be contemplated even by the most liberal interpretation of ideology as taking place in less than three years. Beginning with Anastas Mikoyan's visit in February, 1960, the Soviet Union allowed itself to be committed economically and politically, but refused to grant Castro or his revolution a status in the bloc.⁸ In addition, the strategy and tactics of the

⁸ Credits granted to Cuba during 1960 by Communist states were approximately: \$60 million from China, \$40 million from Czechoslovakia, \$15 million from Rumania, \$5 million from Bulgaria and \$100 million from the Soviet Union.

⁹ See M. Danilevich, "The Growing Force of the Struggle for Independence in Latin America," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia*, no. 9, 1960, pp. 90ff. Other factors such as the growing disappointment in developments in Africa were also responsible for the change in line.

¹⁰ The Chilean Communist party was particularly opposed to accepting the Cuban type of revolution.

¹¹ A. Kartsev, "The Guerrilla Movement," *International Affairs*, no. 7 (July, 1962), pp. 94f. The use of guerrilla tactics was not confined to Latin America: "Actual experience and the practice of the national liberation movement has proved the untenability of the theory of non-violence. Many peoples began their fight for independence by peaceful, non-violent means and yet the colonialist reply to this was mass repressions, imprisonment and torture. . . . Guerrilla warfare is the most typical form of armed struggle in national-liberation wars." Y. Dolgoplov, "National-Liberation Wars in the Present Epoch," *ibid.*, no. 2, 1962, pp. 20-21.

¹² The Chinese have continued to endorse the unqualified use of guerrilla tactics in Latin America: "Why do we think guerrilla warfare is the correct road in the conditions obtaining in America today? Why must the guerrilla movement be the principle means of struggle in America: as we see it, the basic reasons are as follows: First, since it is acknowledged that the enemy will fight to maintain his political power, it is necessary to take into consideration the elimination of the repressive army. . . . Secondly, account should be taken of the general condition of the Latin American peasantry and the increasingly explosive character of its struggle against the feudal structures under a social situation where the local exploiters work in collusion with foreign exploiters. . . . Thirdly, the continental character of the struggle should be taken into consideration." *Peking Review*, no. 2 (January 10, 1964), p. 18.

Soviet Union moved more into line with Castro's view, stressing the importance of organizing the peasantry, a harder attitude toward national bourgeois leaders and governments, and a greater acceptance of the role of guerrilla warfare in Latin America,⁹ in spite of some resistance from the local Communists.¹⁰

The Soviet Union finally agreed, and accepted Cuba into the socialist brotherhood in the spring of 1962. Apparently an important factor was Khrushchev's decision to use Cuba as a missile base. This made the risk worth taking. The admission of Cuba initiated a crash program to place the missiles in Cuba, and marked a sharp increase in guerrilla warfare in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru, and the general acceptance of the use of force for Latin America. "Armed guerrilla-type struggle waged by individual groups against tyranny, United States imperialist domination and its consequences is a feature of the national liberation movement unfolding in a number of the Latin American Countries."¹¹

THE U.S.S.R. BACKS AWAY

The shift to Castro's revolutionary strategy by the Soviet Union lasted only a few months and was withdrawn along with the missiles. In addition to the fears aroused by the missile crisis, the growing Sino-Soviet split may also have hastened the retreat, since Castro's strategy was almost identical to that which the Chinese were advocating.¹² With its December issue, "Problems of Peace and Socialism," *World Marxist Review*, the organ of international communism, began to include articles condemning guerrilla tactics for individual countries in Latin America. Subsequently, the general concept of guerrilla war was challenged. "Revolution cannot be artificially aroused" and armed struggle should only be used where the objective conditions are correct or where the reactionaries are employing mass force. Soviet tactics returned to legal methods and an emphasis on national fronts of all anti-imperialist forces with the Popular Front of Chile again serving as the model and acknowledged as the most suc-

cessful Communist party in Latin America.¹³

Legality provides the democratic forces and especially the vanguard of the proletariat better conditions for building contacts with the masses and their organizations and movements; it favors the growth of class consciousness and strengthens the faith of the working class in its own power.¹⁴

To make this retreat effective it was important for the Soviet leaders to bring Castro to heel. This proved not to be an easy task. Although Castro was almost completely dependent on Eastern Europe economically, he

¹³ "But it by no means follows from this [guerrilla activities earlier approved by Moscow in Venezuela and Guatemala] that the revolutionaries of the continent should set out for the mountains and the countryside at once and organize guerrilla detachments there. Such a decision would be a grave error, for it underestimates the forces of imperialism and reaction and overestimates the degree of readiness of the masses for struggle; it does not take into account the national features in the various countries of Latin America," writes H. B. Klee, "The Revolutionary Situation and the Liberation Struggle of the People of Guatemala," *World Marxist Review*, VII, 4 (April, 1964), p. 22. See also Enrike Rodriges, "Cuba and Revolution in Latin America," *Kommunist*, no. 16, 1963, p. 102 and "For Activating Mass Movements, for Unity of the Democratic Forces," *ibid.*, no. 10, 1963, pp. 96-102.

The Guatemalan Communist party which has continued its rather unsuccessful guerrilla activities is finding it increasingly hard to defend its tactics under the new line. See Alfredo Guerra Borges, "The Experience of Guatemala: Some Problems of the Revolutionary Struggle Today," *World Marxist Review*, VII, 6 (June, 1964), pp. 12-18.

¹⁴ Alcira de la Pena, et al, "The Peoples of Latin America Uphold Their Rights," *ibid.*, VII, 1 (January, 1964), p. 35.

¹⁵ See Castro's Santiago celebration speech, July 26, 1964.

¹⁶ The Soviet propaganda is also trying to make virtue out of Cuba's return to a one-crop export, previously condemned as characteristic of a colonial type of economy: "The Cuban economy has not followed the adventurist path of autarchy advocated by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Cuba has not intended to develop a modern industry on her own or to simultaneously reorganize the entire structure of agriculture to provide the country with everything she needs. The Cuban revolutionaries have chosen the right way, that of economic co-operation with the world Socialist community, the development of those branches (chiefly the sugar industry) which are most in line with the local conditions, technology, experience, market conditions and possibilities of economic co-operation with other countries." *International Affairs*, no. 8 (August, 1964), p. 96.

¹⁷ For a general summary of the Soviet ideological position see M. Kudachkin and M. Mostovetz, "The Liberalization Movement in Latin America," *Kommunist*, no. 11, 1964, pp. 121-130.

resisted being muzzled and continued to export his type of revolution. Since his sympathies were with China, it was to his interest to play Moscow off against Peking to refuse to take sides and to try to keep the split from becoming final. But Moscow would not permit Castro's neutrality; there were several exchanges before Castro capitulated verbally to the U.S.S.R. during his visit to Russia first in May, 1963, and again in January, 1964. Indeed, there is still serious doubt as to whether Castro follows the Soviet line. His propaganda organs still resist any attack on China and still stress the use of force. Exchange of delegations with China continues and there is evidence that Castro has not stopped exporting revolution.¹⁵

In spite of Castro's resistance and bootleg revolutionary activities, the Soviet Union has been able to enforce its line in Latin America. The pro-Chinese factions in Latin American parties thus far have been a small minority and even where they have been the most successful, as in Brazil, they have not made serious inroads into the pro-Soviet Communist movement. Equally important has been the decline of Castro's appeal. On the basis of the Soviet treatment of Castro in the missile crisis, Cuba appears to many Latin Americans to be little more than a Soviet satellite, not so free of the U.S.S.R. as other Latin American countries are of United States hegemony. Cuba's continued dependence on the U.S.S.R. enforces this picture.¹⁶ Nor does Cuba's deteriorating economic position, represented by a 25 per cent decline in the gross national product in five years, encourage other revolutionaries to follow Cuba. The success of the recent O.A.S. (Organization of American States) resolution in bringing about a break in relations with Cuba indicates that Latin American governments are much less fearful of Castro's popularity.

THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION

In its struggle with China for the allegiance of Communists and revolutionaries, the Soviet Union has been forced to spell out its tactical position on Latin America more clearly than ever before.¹⁷ Khrushchev has apparently

decided not to outbid the Chinese for the most radical line but has returned to his moderate policies of about 1960-1961.¹⁸

As always, the number one enemy in Soviet propaganda is the United States. The recent success of the United States in mobilizing opinion against Castro and preventing the spread of revolution confirms, according to Soviet propaganda, the Soviet Union's previous belief in the strength of United States hegemony over Latin America. The propaganda stresses the increased cleverness of United States imperialism in its use of "liberal regimes that are to create the illusion of 'peoples rule'" (*Izvestia*, November 20, 1963) and its employment of innocent youths in the Peace Corps. In its propaganda attacks the Soviet Union also includes the moderate left regime of Betancourt and his successors in Venezuela. This is a clear recognition of the damaging effect of Betancourt's success on Communist interests in Latin America. The number two enemy in the Western Hemisphere is now China, which is condemned for trying to split the Communist movement in Latin America.

Compared to the "adventurist" line of China and Castro, although the latter is not mentioned by name, the tactic of the national front is proclaimed as the only true Leninist policy and, by implication, the only sane policy in the nuclear age. There is an "indissoluble link of the struggle for peace with the

national liberation movement" (*Pravda*, August 20, 1963). The Soviet government's strategy of seeking diplomatic and trade relations with all governments is stressed as the only policy compatible with the creation of national fronts in the underdeveloped countries.

It is argued that the primary needs of these countries in their development toward socialism is economic progress.¹⁹ This can best be accomplished by peaceful relations with the Soviet bloc rather than by means of a cold war and *putschist* policies which only endanger world peace. "Nobody will believe that the problems of national renaissance of the liberated countries can be solved on the battlefield," declared Khrushchev in an interview with editors of African newspapers (*Pravda*, December 22, 1963). During the last few months the Soviet Union has become apprehensive about the new anti-Communist measures, particularly in Brazil, but thus far it has made no effort to retaliate by breaking off relations or to interpret the acts as a reason to change its policy of normalizing relations with all countries.

While it is essential to keep Castro under tight reins, it is also important for the U.S.S.R. to restore some of his prestige. Thus the singing of Castro's praises as a revolutionary is still a central propaganda theme. The Soviet government at the same time supports and encourages Castro's pleas for improved relations with the United States.²⁰

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¹⁸ In one aspect the shift has been back to an early period. The U.S.S.R. no longer recognizes the national liberation movement as the primary force in the anti-imperialist struggle. The U.S.S.R. now condemns China for placing "the national-liberation movement . . . as central in the modern epoch." . . . Communists have never considered the national liberation movement to be the main factor leading to the collapse of world capitalism. . . . *Izvestia*, July 16, 1963.

¹⁹ "A constantly growing contribution from the socialist countries, to the development of the national-liberation revolution and to the growth of world revolutionary forces lies in economic, technical and cultural aid to the liberated peoples in their struggle to strengthen national independence for the final victory over colonialism," *Pravda*, July 18, 1963.

²⁰ "The establishment of normal relations between the United States and the Republic of Cuba would be in the interests of the peoples of both states and would contribute to a strengthening of peace and international security." *Pravda*, September 12, 1963.

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"What will happen to Soviet education in the future will still depend largely on the needs of the state, rather than on the needs or desires of its citizens," notes this specialist, who points out that "it is much less clear . . . what the requirements of the future are than it was 30 years ago on the eve of industrialization."

The Soviet School Reform

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THE GREAT REFORM of the Soviet educational system initiated in December, 1958, in the name of strengthening the links between learning and life, between classroom and work bench, was motivated by a number of needs.¹ Neither the first nor, obviously, the last alteration in the form and content of Soviet education, this reform was designed above all to meet the manpower requirements of a recently and quickly industrialized society—requirements for skills which it would have been too costly to transmit in the process of production itself. It was intended that Russian boys and girls from then on would acquire along with their

Russian, their physics, biology, mathematics, civics, and foreign languages, a measure of vocational training and labor experience. This was to prepare them both practically and psychologically to make a contribution to the national economy without extensive further training.

The overall goal of what was called the "polytechnization" of the school and its curriculum—reducing the proportion of academic content and adding non-academic subjects (such as carpentry, livestock breeding, automobile mechanics, or lathe and milling machine operation)—was to be achieved by making eight years of "general and polytechnical education" compulsory for ages 7 to 15 by 1962–1963. In addition, a heavy dose, most often two days a week, of actual work in various branches of the economy was planned for those who continued in school for another three years.

On the face of it, this was neither a new nor a radical departure from previously stated goals. The 1919 program of the Communist party also had called for "general and polytechnical training" to the age of 17 and for "close ties between education and socially useful labor." But what made the 1958 reform so drastic and so important is the fact that it marked a retreat from the ideal of ten years of *general* education for all, which in 1931 had replaced the 1919 program. The 1931 plan had been designed to improve the quality of the education Soviet youngsters received and to ready them for

¹ There has been no comprehensive appraisal of the impact the 1958 reform has had on the Soviet educational system. Professor Nicholas DeWitt's *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR* is still the best survey of the purposes and trends of the changes begun almost six years ago. I would here like to acknowledge my special debt to him and refer the reader to some of his articles for a fuller understanding of the causes and implications of educational policy and practice in the U.S.S.R.: "Polytechnical Education and the Soviet School Reform," *Harvard Educational Review*, Spring, 1960; "Soviet Brainpower," *International Science and Technology*, January, 1962; "Soviet Education at the Crossroads," *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals*, April, 1963, points to some of the problems encountered as a result of the reform, as does "Strategic Problems of Educational Policy in the Soviet Union and the United States," *Comparative Education Review*, June, 1963. Also see G. Z. Bereday, *The Politics of Soviet Education* (New York, 1960). The most direct reflection of recent Soviet discussions and concern is, of course, to be found in their pedagogical publications and much of it is accessible in English in the journal *Soviet Education*, published by the International Arts and Sciences Press, as well as in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*.

further academic training. The earlier polytechnical emphasis had too often meant little more than vocational training and had not, it was felt, provided an adequate general education or prepared fully literate persons "who know the fundamentals of knowledge" for a higher education.

The reforms of 1931 were to remedy these failings. They succeeded so well that many young people came to look on 10 years of schooling as a right and, as the authorities complained, regarded a school-leaving certificate as an exemption from work. The theoretical emphasis of the secondary school almost pushed its graduates in the direction of the university or higher technical institute. If graduates failed to gain admission, they were nonetheless reluctant to go to work in factories or on farms, as did the majority of those who left school after the compulsory seven years. By 1958, the secondary schools turned out seven times the number of graduates in 1940 (1.5 million, or one-third of the age group), but only one-fifth of them could be absorbed in higher education, the golden gate to social and economic advancement.

The 1958 reform was supposed to change all that. The goal of 10 years of compulsory education (which had, in any case, not been reached) was abandoned for an even more realistic target of eight compulsory years, i.e., to age 15, to be attained in the 1960's; while in the 1970's everyone would have an opportunity for a complete secondary education. This would mean 11 years of schooling, to age 17 or 18.

But an opportunity is not an obligation, and it appears that for most Russian youngsters full-time schooling is to end after eight years. Many will indeed continue in the last three classes of the 11-year school, which will also include vocational and labor preparation, but a majority will carry on their education, if at all, under a variety of part-time arrangements, in evening, summer or correspondence courses and schools. Plan figures for the Russian Republic (with 56 per cent of the country's total population) give some sense of the proportions involved. In 1965; 4.6 million students are expected to complete

the eighth grade; of these, 2 million are to receive three more years of schooling in the 11-year day schools, while 2.6 million are to take jobs and attend evening or shift classes. In the country as a whole, Professor DeWitt has estimated, about two-fifths of the age group 15-18 attend senior secondary schools on a full-time basis; other observers estimate 40 to 50 per cent of eighth-graders going to work and studying part-time.

It is hard to say whether these figures conform to the expectations the Party held of the reorganization begun in 1959, but Khrushchev originally intended that evening and extension courses should become the major access roads to further and higher education. The preference in university admission given to those who have served at least two years in industry or agriculture was also designed to diminish the pressure for access to higher learning and to deflect many young people from their academic preoccupation into practical pursuits.

THE SCHOOL TRANSFORMED

The manpower shortage resulting from the war and the need for skilled hands form part of the background of the curricular changes of the last five years. The Russians also believe that the labor of hand and brain should be equally valued and that the emergence of a "white-handed" élite should be prevented. What does the Soviet school look like after its extensive transformation? In the first place, the basic pattern has been shifted from a 4-3-3 year sequence (elementary, junior high and high school) to a 4-4-3 year sequence. What this has meant in numerical terms regarding the movement of pupils from first through eleventh grades is not clear. We know total enrollment figures: there are, at present, 44 million pupils in the general primary and secondary schools.

But we do not know how many of those entering first grade finish the fourth, eighth and eleventh grades and continue on to the next stage. Enrollment figures by grades are not available.

There are occasional insights: that in the Russian Republic, for instance, 80.5 per

cent of seventh graders continued on to the eighth grade in 1961-1962; that in the same year there were 1.5 million pupils in grades 9 through 11 and that more than one million received their secondary matriculation certificates (or high school diplomas) in 1962 and 800,000 in 1963. Many of these certificates were, however, obtained by part-time students, perhaps 50 per cent or more in a given year, so that we can make only informed guesses about those who receive a complete secondary education.

It is, however, reasonably certain that almost 100 per cent finish the 4-year elementary course, no mean achievement, when it is remembered that in 1959 one-half of the population over 15 had had only four years of education or less. A complete primary education is now a universal phenomenon and the problem of literacy is no longer an educational issue. Equally, the U.S.S.R. is coming close to universality of junior secondary education, or will very shortly.

More serious questions arise about the last three grades, not only for those who would like to know what happens to the 15-year olds from an educational and sociological point of view; but for the planners. They must decide how the promise of educational opportunity for the individual is to be combined with the country's needs, in other words, how many are to be educated and for what. This is not a matter which can safely be left to personal preferences or monetary incentives. If, as noted earlier, two-fifths of the relevant age group attend the senior secondary grades and 12 per cent go on to higher education (as compared with one-third in the United States), this does not suggest that a fundamental change has taken place since 1958 when one-third of the age group completed high school, with one-fifth going beyond. It is to be expected, however, that full-time enrollment in the last three years of the secondary school will continue to show a downward trend.

What has changed decisively is the content of education and its combination with some kind of vocational training and work experience. It is this which will have the most

profound impact on the life goals and chances of young Russians. In keeping with the goals of the reform, the school curriculum has been expanded from 9,800 hours (for 10 years) to 12,800 hours (for 11 years), and the proportion of subject matter devoted to vocational and labor training increased nearly four-fold over 1958. In eleven years, a student would spend 37 per cent of his time on languages, literature, geography and history; almost 30 per cent on mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, and so forth and nearly one-third in various forms of vocational training and practical work. This means different emphases at different stages of the educational process. Any impression that attendance at grades 9 to 11 is the equivalent of a college preparatory course is quickly corrected by closer examination. In these three years, 27 per cent and 29 per cent respectively of study time are given to the humanities and the sciences, and 44 per cent to labor activity (including about two days of work per week in factories, shops, hospitals, garages, building sites and so on) and the instruction connected with it.

That the work done by students does not serve purely pedagogical ends becomes clear from the fact that they are paid for it and that the character of the trades stressed by a given school is as nearly as possible related to the economic requirements of the region in which it is located. This is a far cry from the original notion of polytechnization which implied not the acquisition of a special skill or trade but exposure to certain broad principles of modern production and their relation to the fundamentals of science. In the primary and intermediate grades, from 10 per cent to 12 per cent of the curriculum is devoted to labor education and training. This ranges from helping to keep the school building clean and work on its garden plot to wood or metal working and, for grades 5 through 8, two or more weeks of full-time work at the end of the school year as well as a weekly stint of "socially useful labor."

There is much to be said for an approach to education which does not assume that the major task of the school is to seek out and

prepare the country's brainpower for advanced training, leaving those who do not qualify feeling less valuable and less worthy. There is merit also in the argument that the well-rounded man must have an acquaintance with more than one culture. It is true, as a group of Soviet scientists wrote in a message to school children, that it will soon be as shameful not to know how diesel and jet engines, electric motors and automated machine tools function as it now is not to know how to read and write. And there is an element of social justice in insisting, as the Soviets have done, that even the talented should get a taste of the labor which goes on in factories and fields and a respect for it. All this has been recognized, and to some small extent has been acted upon, in some other countries as well. But it is doubtful whether Russian educational reform was primarily motivated by these considerations and, more importantly, whether it has in fact brought these goals closer to realization.

Soviet parents, and presumably their offspring, remain unconvinced that the interests of the younger generation are best served by a job and a work-oriented school and by attempts to get them to give up full-time education after the eighth grade. An education is, after all, an essential for success in a social system where inheritance of money or position carries next to no weight. It is for this reason, one must assume, that parents try to keep their children in school, with the result that in 1960, in the Russian Republic, 64 per cent of those who graduated from the eighth grade had to be taken into the ninth, instead of the 50 per cent for which the authorities had planned.²

Yet parents anxious to give their children the best possible start in life are not the only ones questioning the application of the reform and some of its implications. There has been effective, and, more seriously, the misuses, which have been reaffirmed time and again. But doubts have been expressed as to whether the polytechnization of the school has been effective, and more seriously, the

question has been raised as to whether there ought not to be some fundamental rethinking of the assumption that labor-polytechnical education can provide *both* the skills needed for a complex economy *and* the special training and abilities for higher education and the development of new knowledge. The discussion of these issues has been remarkably frank and lively, showing that the time is past when such complicated matters could be settled by fiat. Discussion also reflects the realization that the educational questions involved are not susceptible of purely ideological or political treatment.

In August, 1964, it was reported from Moscow that the 11-year system of primary and secondary education had been reduced to 10 years. The saving in time is to be made mainly at the expense of industrial training, suggesting that the senior secondary school, where it was most heavily stressed, may be shortened to two years. No detailed information is yet available about the curricular and other changes involved, but presumably the new pattern will be a 4-4-2 year sequence, with a somewhat heavier academic emphasis, especially in the last two years, and a sharper separation between vocational and academic training. This modification of the 1958 reform goes at least some way towards meeting the objections of those of its critics who felt that 11 years of schooling kept young people for too long and to little purpose away from productive labor or a higher education.

What will happen to Soviet education in the future will still depend largely on the needs of the state, rather than on the needs or desires of its citizens, but it is much less clear in a developed society what the requirements of the future are than it was 30 years ago on the eve of industrialization. It is not enough to cite Marxist-Leninist formulas on the desirability of an upbringing "that will make people Communist-minded and highly cultured, fitted for physical and mental labor, for active participation in a variety of social, governmental, scientific and cultural spheres." What has to be decided is whether the heavy investment in a job-oriented education will pay off. That is the question

² See Herbert Ritvo, ed., *The New Soviet Society* (New York: The New Leader, 1962), p. 215n.

being posed and on that score the doctrine offers no reliable guidance.

CRITICISMS

Even those who have no quarrel with the aim of vocational training have had ample cause to wonder whether the school is the best place for acquiring it. To start with, there were (and still are) complaints about inadequate facilities and staff. "It is five years now," a group of school principals wrote in January, 1964, "since the law on polytechnical education was adopted, but many schools do not yet have the proper conditions for practical production training." The prevalent method, the educators said, is a fictitious one, with a trained operative working and the students standing behind him and watching. "There are schools in which the two days set aside for production training are a complete waste, because nothing gets done."

This is not so much a case of principled resistance as of the recognition of practical difficulties. Vocational training requires not only skilled workers but also skilled teachers. That combination is not easy to find and is costly to train, for if men are taken away from the production line to instruct, they defeat, at least in the short run, the purposes of the reform, namely the increase of production. It has been estimated by a Soviet source that it may be 15 years before the required number of instructors is available. In the meantime, there is much waste effort and make-work of various kinds to satisfy requirements.

Equipment is also a troublesome point. A high official complained in *Izvestiia* in May, 1963, that even in large factories, where it should not be difficult to set up training sections or shops for pupil-trainees, very little is being done for the schools. Managers do not like to tie up valuable time and equipment. The result: many large enterprises have only 10 to 15 places for students; many of them, to save labor and materials, fulfill their training obligations in a purely perfunctory and mechanical way. Children are often taught "trades," where instruction is

easy and relatively brief. At one factory, children spent three years learning how to coat rubber overshoes; at another enterprise, they were taught for three years how to become packers.

Then there are the inherent difficulties of a system in which little is left to chance and where a plan is supposed to provide for all contingencies. Thus the plan may call for carpenters, but somehow a felt-boot factory has been given the job of training them. There are cases where as many hours have been spent turning out seamstresses as laboratory assistants in chemistry or radio technicians. Such problems are even more pronounced in rural districts where educational facilities still lag behind those in the towns and where there is special reluctance to divert scarce resources from a critical sector of the economy.

While education falls short of fulfilling its polytechnical task, its traditional function of academic preparation has also suffered. There has been no retreat from the proposition that the school must prepare scholars as well as workers and lay the foundation for advanced study and research, but there is increasing concern among educators as to whether these goals are compatible. In 1961, 112,000 out of 227,000 graduates of daytime secondary schools failed their university entrance examinations; in 1958/1959, almost one-third of all evening students did not complete their course; the number of drop-outs in rural areas has been particularly high and has been ascribed to the low level of knowledge and instruction.

Among those admitted to higher educational institutions, many were not qualified and needed refresher courses, a fact which has been viewed as an indictment of the preferential treatment given worker applicants. Even the Council of Ministers has become aware of the problem of combining work and study. Asking that more attention be paid to the provision of textbooks, study aids, instructors and time for study, the Council noted that a considerable number of those who work and study do not finish, with an especially high attrition rate in the younger classes.

The overburdening of pupils has reached a point where not just the reduction but the abolition of labor training has been suggested. This is not a likely prospect, for it would mean too vast a reversal, both practically and ideologically, too soon. But that such demands can be voiced suggests that some modification of the present mixture of labor and general education is in the offing. For, in the long run, it may prove more costly for a society which is no longer in the period of primary industrialization to lose potential scientists and technological innovators than to supply an adequate number of skilled workers for the immediate future.

The preferential weight given to work experience in university admissions has also been challenged by one of the country's leading physicists, who asked whether people with special talents should not be exempted from that ruling. His position is all the more understandable when it is realized that in 1960-1961, for example, only 67,500 college and university students came straight from secondary schools.

Thus the difficulties encountered by polytechnical education are not material ones alone. "Even if material conditions were excellent," wrote one teacher, "we would still . . . fail to solve the main task: the psychological preparation of youth for work and a free choice of occupation." All this has had the result of recalling that polytechnization does not mean narrow vocational preparation.

Yet the realization that the broad technical outlook, plus mastery of a particular trade, plus a sustained taste of on-the-job experience may be, if not impossible, unadvisable for everyone has caused a minor retreat from a rigid interpretation of the principles animating the 1958 reform. In some fields, a measure of differentiated instruction already exists. This automatically implies a process of student selection which differentiates among those who are more and those who are less able. Not all resistance has been overcome. Suggestions that the general curriculum of the senior secondary grades (i.e., 9-11) should reduce the uniform minimum for general education subjects, for vocational

training and work practice and that students should specialize in one of four areas (physics-mathematics, chemistry, biology, general) have been opposed on the ground that this would lead to "professional narrow-mindedness which at times develops into a peculiar kind of snobbery and the sense of being an 'élite'."

GREATER DIFFERENTIATION

But the Soviets are realists and have come to realize, in practice if not in theory, that exceptions must be made for the sake of special talents, special fields and special needs. Advocates of greater differentiation have pointed out that there are already 700 schools where instruction is conducted in foreign languages. There are a good many secondary music and art schools, as well as over 100 schools offering mathematics for computer technicians, while the possibility of setting up others is being weighed.

As the most striking example of educational "élitism," there are now four "physico-mathematical" schools in the U.S.S.R. which children attend for three years after the eighth grade on the basis of a special examination or participation in a nation-wide mathematical "Olympiad." Though here, too, any notion of narrow specialization is disavowed and university acceptance is not guaranteed, it was the state's declared purpose in creating these schools to prepare their students for advanced instruction.

In addition to these beginnings of "furcation" at the secondary level, steps have been taken to make sure that the most capable students can go directly to the university from the eleventh grade. "After all," said the Rector of Moscow University in February, 1964, "only very able, very creative people, who have worked hard and long in secondary school, can pass the difficult entrance examination in mathematics, physics and chemistry with the highest grades. Yet we were compelled to enroll instead a number of people who had only adequate grades." And talent, he added, was as worthy of respect and nurture in science as in the arts.

New admission rules for institutions of

higher learning now reserve 20 per cent of all places for the best secondary school graduates if there is a large influx of workers. Nor has the latter's preferential status gone unchallenged, and it has been demanded that only those who have worked 2 years in material production and those whose work experience is related to their chosen field of study should continue to be enrolled on a non-competitive basis.

The most radical innovation was suggested by a provincial school teacher and reported in *Izvestiia* earlier this year, a fact which gives his opinion greater weight than it might normally have. The 11-year school, his argument ran, plus military and production service, postpones too long a higher education or an occupation and is adequate preparation for neither. The upper-graders in classes 9 to 11 want most often to become doctors, engineers, artists or teachers; few want to be milkmaids, cattlemen, carpenters, plasterers, painters, waiters or tailors. (This, it may be noted, is not new, and it is just this preference for the "nicer" jobs that was a major reason for the 1958 reform.) But at a younger age, our teacher continues, children dream of all those occupations which they seem to hold in contempt after a few more years of school. At 14 or 15 they want to work with their hands; a little later they have to spend two or three more years in school, painfully learning a trade which, if studied full-time, could be mastered quickly. "Which mechanic is better? The one who spends three years, on and off, or one who has learned intensively for half a year? Rural schools take three years to train a milkmaid, whereas this can be done in three months." And the same goes for tractor drivers, machinists and a host of other trades.

The solution is to have young people complete their entire primary and secondary schooling in nine years, before they are 16, and then acquire their vocation. But not, apparently, all of them. "It is clear that privileges for former soldiers, production workers, etc., will remain, but this should not prevent the admission to institutions of higher learning of 16-year olds who may become

young scholars." In some experimental situations, required subjects have been taught intensively and with a saving of time, and the success of these experiments has been cited as warranting reduction of the primary years from four to three.

Valid pedagogical and psychological arguments can and have been made for this. There is, in the Soviet as in the American school, much waste motion, much unnecessary repetition and rote learning. But whether in the end there will be nine or only eight years of schooling in the Soviet Union, whether production training will be concentrated in a shorter time span or eliminated altogether, will not be determined by pedagogical considerations alone. Such considerations have come to play an increasingly important role, but they will not determine the direction the Soviet school will take in the next few years.

"Communism," a Soviet educator has written, "brings with it not the elimination of physical and mental labor but a change in their nature and content and their unification. This is a long process, of course, and will be completed when communism has reached its full development." Until such time, and it is a good while off yet, the Soviet school, like school systems in other developed countries, will continue to experiment to find the right "mix" which will assure an adequate supply of industrial skills without drying up the sources of invention and creativity.

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As a corollary to his picture of life in the Soviet Union for the Jews of the twentieth century, this author says, "The intensive openly anti-Semitic campaign against 'cosmopolitans,' the destruction of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, a second smashing of the Yiddish press, a second 'purge' of the Jewish elite . . . and finally the concoction of the 'doctor's case'—all these things are still fresh in the memory of Soviet Jewry."

The Soviet Jewish Minority

By SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ

Author of Labor in the Soviet Union

IN THE SOVIET UNION, the line between the dual concepts of nation and nationality has become very distinct, because of the statutory assignment of a nationality to every Soviet citizen. The Soviet identity-booklet, which the Russians call a "passport" and which is compulsory for every adult, always indicates the bearer's "nationality" in addition to his citizenship (i.e., his nation). This is a characteristic feature of the Soviet legal system and it has been borrowed by the other countries of the "socialist camp."

"Nation" is mainly a political and juridical concept, while "nationality" is a term that has sociological and socio-psychological connotations. A nation is inseparably associated in the mind with a given territory, which, apart from the indigenous nationality, may be—and usually is—inhabited by some people who belong to various other nationalities. If their number is rather considerable, they become *national minorities*, sometimes living as a concentrated group within a given national territory.

¹ For a number of the more backward national groups (the Russian terminology often avoids designating them as "nationalities" and often uses the term *narodnosti* which is a synonym that has more pronounced ethnological connotations), it was even necessary to create the very tools of cultural development—to construct an alphabet and lay down the principles of a written language.

² See Vladimir Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russian edition, vol. 16, p. 216.

While rejecting outright any idea of national cultural autonomy, the leaders of the Soviet Union have not been able to ignore the cultural needs of minority nationalities and have looked for ways of satisfying them. Cultural advancement in general has been a constant nationwide problem for the country, particularly since the revolution. Its solution with respect to the minority nationalities has demanded special efforts, primarily in the establishment of national schools and in the development of a national literature and press.¹ There has been a great deal of activity in these fields, and although it has often been misdirected to serve the interests of the dictatorship, on the whole it has contributed to the very considerable rise in the cultural level of the country.

But all this did not begin at once. In keeping with Bolshevik principles and traditions, the original attitude of the Soviet policy-makers was largely hostile to the very idea of a national culture.²

However, after their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks had to beat a hasty retreat in this field. Inability to consolidate the country politically in the face of the growing dissatisfaction of the national minorities forced the Communist party to change its position with regard to the cultures of the national minorities. The Tenth Congress of the Commun-

ist Party adopted in March, 1921, a resolution on "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question," which emphasized that:

The task of the Party is to assist the toiling masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples in catching up with Central Russia, which has far outstripped them; and to help them:

(a) To develop and consolidate their own Soviet statehood in a form consistent with these peoples' national way of life;

(b) To develop and consolidate their own courts, administration, economic organs, government organs, using the native tongue and staffed by local people familiar with the customs and psychological characteristics of the local population;

(c) To set up a press, schools, theatres, clubs and cultural and educational institutions generally, using the native tongue.

(d) To organize and develop a large system of courses and schools for the purposes both of general educational and vocational and technical training conducted in the native tongue, in order more speedily to train indigenous cadres of skilled workers and Soviet and Party workers in all spheres of administration and first of all in the sphere of education.

This policy very quickly led, not without internal friction, to a considerable upsurge in the culture of most minority nationalities.³ A similar upsurge was seen in the case of the Jews although it was much less sharp than in most other cases. In all of this, the position of the Jews was particularly difficult, since their national cultural development was hampered not only by the original negative attitude of the authorities toward any national culture, but also by direct non-recognition of the Jews as a nationality.

This was an old dispute that had been considerably complicated by the failure to distinguish between nation and nationality. Bolshevik theory had adopted a strongly negative position in this dispute: the Jews were neither a nation nor a nationality. Nevertheless, after the formation of the So-

viet government and its People's Commissariat for Nationalities in the fall of 1917, there was established early in 1918 a Commissariat for Jewish National Affairs within the framework of that People's Commissariat.

Its functions, however, might have been better described as antinational. At that time the Communist party felt itself completely cut off from the Jewish masses and intelligentsia. According to an official report to the First Conference of Jewish Commissariats and Jewish Sections in October, 1918, the Central Commissariat, its local organs (the local commissariats) and the Jewish sections operating under local Communist party committees had

two kinds of tasks: on the one hand, there are the *purely technical tasks*—propaganda among the Jewish workers; and on the other, we must *enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Jewish street*. [Underlining is the author's.]

The resolution approved by the Conference made it quite clear what was meant by enforcing the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Jewish street:

The First Conference of Jewish Commissariats and Jewish Sections declares that there is no longer a place in our life for the various institutions which thus far have been running things in the Jewish street, or for a Jewish community elected on the basis of the famous "four-tail" ballot [universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and the secret ballot—S.S.]. . . .

Made strong by the victory of the proletariat in the October revolution, the Jewish worker takes power into his own hands, proclaims the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Jewish street and calls upon all Jewish workers to rally round the Jewish Commissariat to safeguard this dictatorship.

The First All-Russian Conference of the Jewish Commissariats and Jewish Sections empowers the Board of the Central Commissariat for Jewish Affairs to take such steps as are necessary to liquidate all bourgeois institutions in a systematic fashion.⁴

This was a blow directed primarily against the Jewish traditional communities—the *kehillas*—which in the summer of 1917 were converted into self-governing bodies organized according to modern democratic principles and performing broad cultural and

³ For a discussion of these developments, see my book, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), pp. 69 ff.

⁴ Originally efforts were made to establish Yevsektzia (Jewish sections) in the local Soviets (hence the term), but they proved unsuccessful and as early as the latter part of 1918 the Jewish sections had become organs of the Party.

social functions. In destroying these communities, however, the Soviet authorities could not close down their various activities—schools, infirmaries, children's institutions, old-age homes, eating establishments—but had to take them over, with the result that the Jewish sections and commissariats were drawn by force of circumstances into Jewish social and, in a broader sense, often national activity.

Gradually, all the social institutions of the *kehillas* were absorbed into the general system of social and health institutions, but the schools required special treatment. At that time, the great majority of the Jewish population outside the cities knew only one language, Yiddish, and the problem of the Jewish school became acute.⁵

The question of schooling in the native language for children of minority nationalities has had a long history in Russia and had already been partially solved in Old Russia. But that was only a modest beginning; on the whole, up to the 1917 revolution, the question had remained without a solution. From the very beginning of the revolution, every group of any importance recognized the right of the minority nationalities to schooling in their native tongue. The Bolsheviks also recognized it.

However, the use of the national language as the language of instruction is only one element of a national school, albeit a most important one. Without the teaching of the national history, the national literature, the national culture, there can be no such thing as even a second-rate national school. These subjects, however,—with the exception of limited instruction in Jewish literature (written in Yiddish, not Hebrew)—were driven out of the Soviet Jewish school.

Such limitations and the official attitude held back the development of the Jewish school, making the evidence of its vitality all the more amazing. For a decade, between the early 1920's and early 1930's, there was a rapid development of schools which taught in Yiddish or in two or three languages (Rus-

sian-Yiddish, Russian-Ukrainian-Yiddish); in Byelorussia the number of Jewish children attending Yiddish-language schools amounted at the beginning of the 1930's to more than two-thirds of the total number of Jewish school-age children, while in the Ukraine the corresponding figure was more than 50 per cent. Thereafter—in Byelorussia, apparently since 1933; in the Ukraine, since 1932—there was a rapid decline of the Jewish school, much more rapid than might be explained by normal cultural assimilation of the Jews in the process of resettling from the regions of their traditional concentration to areas with insignificant Jewish population.

Today, looked at in historical retrospect, this new development of the Jewish school, with all its negative features, must be regarded as a positive factor in Jewish national development during this early Soviet period. The same may be said of the Yiddish press, Yiddish literature, the Yiddish theater, and indeed—however paradoxical it may sound—of Jewish social life in general. Mention must also be made of another very interesting feature that marked this period; the establishment of some small Jewish administrative districts, Jewish *soviets*, and Jewish courts. While they were of extremely modest size, their inherent significance cannot be doubted. In the light of subsequent experience, in comparison with what Soviet Jews have gone through ever since, this period almost seems like a kind of national resurgence.

The first half of the 1930's marked the beginning of a new, retrogressive phase in the history of the Soviet Jews. The leadership of the Communist party lost all interest in a Jewish policy, even in its Communist version. In 1930, the central Jewish Section (along with all the local Jewish sections) was simply dissolved and its responsibilities were not transferred to any other body. The Commissariat for Jewish Affairs had disappeared long before. As early as 1920, it had been renamed the Jewish Department of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities; in 1924, the Jewish Department had been shifted to the Nationalities Department operating under the authority of the Presidium of the

⁵ In the 1926 census, 72.6 per cent of the Jews gave Yiddish as their mother-tongue.

All-Union Central Executive Committee; the petition of the Conference of Jewish Sections that same year, suggesting the establishment of a Division for Jewish Affairs in the Nationalities Department, had not been acted on.

The liquidation of the Jewish Section marked the beginning of major changes, although no one seems to have fully realized it at the time. Soon, however, a change of climate began to be felt in all spheres of Jewish life.⁶ A new wave of anti-Semitism began to develop, but this time—unlike the situation in the 1920's—the authorities adopted an attitude of indifference or even semi-approval. There began a systematic elimination of Jews from the administration and the government apparatus, and the access of Jews to higher education was restricted. The “great purge” was carried out everywhere with extreme severity but in the case of the Jews it betrayed a special tendency: a tendency aimed at the almost complete destruction of the Jewish élite and its cultural institutions, and at the complete destruction of the Yiddish press.

The Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939, enormously worsened the situation. Now anti-Semitism was often practiced without any attempt at concealment. Hitler's subsequent attack on the U.S.S.R. seemed to break the trend. The formation in 1942 of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the revival of the newspaper *Einigkeit* and the “Emes” publishing house seemed to indicate a basic change. But that was an illusion. Even during the war there were a number of cases in which the Communist party leadership evidenced a thoroughly hostile attitude towards the Jews; and after the war the anti-Jewish tendency began to assert itself more distinctly. The intensive openly anti-Semitic campaign against “cosmopolitans,” the destruction of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Commit-

tee, a second smashing of the Yiddish press, a second “purge” of the Jewish élite even more severe than that of the 1930's, and finally the concoction of the “doctors' case,”⁷—all these things are still fresh in the memory of Soviet Jewry.

Stalin's death augured better times for Soviet Jews but for three years after his death, there were practically no changes in the field of minorities policy—Jewish and non-Jewish alike. Even the limited amnesty ordered shortly after the dictator's death did not mean very much for those who had been punished in accordance with his national policy. The fact that the active members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had been placed on trial and executed in August, 1952, continued to be carefully concealed. Even the revelations about the “cult of personality” at a closed session of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in February, 1956, did not touch on the destruction of minority élites in general, to say nothing of the Jewish élite.

When, on April 4, 1956, the Warsaw Yiddish-language Communist newspaper *Folksh-time* reported the shooting of Jewish writers and the leading members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Leonid Ilyichev, then Chief of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now Chairman of the Ideological Commission responsible to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, called the *Folksh-time* article “libellous and anti-Soviet.”

Meanwhile, there was not even a hint of the possibility of the Soviet government's returning to any Jewish minority policy, if only on a modest scale. Finally, the question was raised with the Soviet government by foreign Jewish Communists. In July, 1956,

(Continued on page 308)

⁶ It is impossible to give an exact date for the beginning of this development. The liquidation of the Jewish Section was in any case neither the cause nor the beginning but only a symptom of what was coming.

⁷ This was a charge, in January, 1953, of murder and conspiracy against 9 Soviet doctors with Jewish affiliation. (See *Current History*, March, 1953, p. 191).

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

U.S.S.R.—U.S. Consular Convention

On May 27, 1964, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States announced that they had drafted a consular convention providing greater protection for citizens of either country residing in the other and giving consular officials unconditional diplomatic immunity. Excerpts from the text of the convention, which has not yet been ratified, follow:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to cooperate in strengthening friendly relations and to regulate consular relations between both states,

Have decided to conclude a consular convention and for this purpose have agreed on the following:

DEFINITIONS—ARTICLE 1

For the purpose of the present Convention, the terms introduced hereunder have the following meaning:

1) "Consular establishment"—means any consulate general, consulate, vice consulate or consular agency;

2) "Consular district"—means the area assigned to a consular establishment for the exercise of consular functions;

3) "Head of consular establishment" means a consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent directing the consular establishment;

4) "Consular officer"—means any person, including the head of the consular establishment, entrusted with the exercise of consular functions. Also included in the definition of "consular officer" are persons assigned to the consular establishment for training in the consular service;

5) "Employee of the consular establishment"—means any person performing administrative, technical, or service functions in a consular establishment.

CONSULAR FUNCTIONS ARTICLE 7

A consular officer shall be entitled within his consular district to perform the following functions, and for this purpose may apply orally or in writing to the competent authorities of the consular district:

1. To protect the rights and interests of the

sending state and its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate;

2. To further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending state and the receiving state and otherwise promote the development of friendly relations between them;

3. To register nationals of the sending state, to issue or amend passports and other certificates of identity, and also to issue entry, exit, and transit visas;

4. To draw up and record certificates of birth and death of citizens of the sending state taking place in the receiving state, to record marriages and divorces, if both persons entering into marriage or divorce are citizens of the sending state, and also to receive such declarations pertaining to family relationships of a national of the sending state as may be required under the law of the sending state, unless prohibited by the laws of the receiving state;

5. To draw up, certify, attest, authenticate, legalize and take other actions which might be necessary to validate any act or document of a legal character, as well as copies thereof, including commercial documents, declarations, registrations, testamentary dispositions, and contracts, upon the application of a national of the sending state, when such document is intended for use outside the territory of the receiving state, and also for any person, when such document is intended for use in the territory of the sending state;

6. To translate any acts and documents into the Russian and English languages and to certify to the accuracy of the translations;

7. To perform other official consular functions entrusted to him by the sending state if they are not contrary to the laws of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 9

If the relevant information is available to the

competent authorities of the receiving state, such authorities shall inform the consular establishment of the death of a national of the sending state.

• • •
ARTICLE 12

1. A consular officer shall have the right within his district to meet with, communicate with, assist, and advise any national of the sending state and, where necessary, arrange for legal assistance for him. The receiving state shall in no way restrict the access of nationals of the sending state to its consular establishments.

2. The appropriate authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer of the sending state about the arrest or detention in other form of a national of the sending state.

3. A consular officer of the sending state shall have the right without delay to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The rights referred to in this paragraph shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights.

• • •
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES
ARTICLE 16

The national flag of the sending state and the consular flag may be flown at the consular establishment, at the residence of the head of the consular by him in the performance of his official duties. establishment, and on his means of transport used. The shield with the national coat-of-arms of the sending state and the name of the establishment may also be affixed on the building in which the consular establishment is located.

ARTICLE 17

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. Unofficial papers shall not be kept in the consular archives.

The buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, used for the purposes of the consular establishment and the residence of the head of the consular establishment, shall be inviolable.

The police and other authorities of the receiving state may not enter the building or that part of the building which is used for the purposes of the consular establishment or the residence of the head of the consular establishment without the consent of the head thereof, persons appointed by him, or the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

ARTICLE 18

1. The consular establishment shall have the

right to communicate with its Government, with the diplomatic mission and the consular establishments of the sending state in the receiving state, or with other diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the sending state, making use of all ordinary means of communication. In such communications, the consular establishment shall have the right to use code, diplomatic couriers, and the diplomatic pouch. The same fees shall apply to consular establishments in the use of ordinary means of communication as apply to the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. The official correspondence of a consular establishment, regardless of what means of communication are used, and the sealed diplomatic pouch bearing visible external marks of its official character, shall be inviolable and not subject to examination or detention by the authorities of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 19

1. Consular officers shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state in matters relating to their official activity. The same applies to employees of the consular establishment, if they are nationals of the sending state.

2. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment who are nationals of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.

3. This immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state of consular officers and employees of the consular establishment of the sending state may be waived by the sending state. Waiver must always be express.

ARTICLE 20

1. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment, on the invitation of a court of the receiving state, shall appear in court for witness testimony. Taking measures to compel a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment who is a national of the sending state to appear in court as a witness and to give witness testimony is not permissible.

• • •
ARTICLE 21

1. Immovable property, situated in the territory of the receiving state, of which the sending state or one or more persons acting in its behalf is the owner or lessee and which is used for diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences for personnel attached to the diplomatic and consular establishments, shall be exempt from taxation of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments other than such as represent payments for specific services rendered.

• • •
ARTICLE 22

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment, who is not a national of the receiving

state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments on official emoluments, salaries, wages, or allowances received by such officer or employee from the sending state in connection with the discharge of his official functions.

ARTICLE 23

1. A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment who is not a national of the receiving state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments, for the payment of which the officer or employee of the consular establishment would otherwise be legally liable.

2. The exemption from taxes or charges provided in paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply in respect to taxes or charges upon:

- a) The acquisition or possession of private immovable property located in the receiving state if the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article do not own or lease this property on the behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the consular establishment;
- b) Income received from sources in the receiving state other than as described in Article 22 of the present Convention;
- c) The transfer by gift of property in the receiving state;
- d) The transfer at death, including by inheritance, of property in the receiving state.

3. However, the exemption from taxes or similar charges provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, applies in respect to movable inherited property left after the death of a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or a member of his family residing with him if they are not nationals of the receiving state or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and if the property was located in the receiving state exclusively in connection with the sojourn in this state of the deceased as a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or member of his family residing with him.

ARTICLE 24

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him, who are not nationals of the receiving state and who do not have the status in the re-

ceiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt in the receiving state from service in the armed forces and from all other types of compulsory service.

ARTICLE 25

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from all obligations under the laws and regulations of the receiving state with regard to the registration of aliens, and obtaining permission to reside, and from compliance with other similar requirements applicable to aliens.

ARTICLE 26

1. The same full exemption from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation shall apply in the receiving state to all articles, including motor vehicles, imported exclusively for the official use of a consular establishment, as apply to articles imported for the official use of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. Consular officers, and employees of the consular establishment, and members of their families residing with them, who are not nationals of the receiving state, and who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be granted, on the basis of reciprocity, the same exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, as are granted to corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

3. For the purpose of paragraph two of this Article the term "corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission" refers to members of the diplomatic staff in the case of consular officers, and to members of the administrative and technical staff in the case of employees of a consular establishment.

ARTICLE 27

Subject to the laws and regulations of the receiving state concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, a consular officer shall be permitted to travel freely within the limits of his consular district to carry out his official duties.

ARTICLE 28

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, including traffic regulations.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE U.S.S.R.

RUSSIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A CONCISE HISTORY. By S. V. UTECHIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 320 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00 cloth, \$2.25 paper.)

In his introduction, the author states: "An attempt is made in this book to present a survey of the history of Russian political thought from the inception of the recorded Russian political tradition to the present day. The bulk of the book is devoted to the last two and a half centuries, while the first two chapters, dealing with medieval and Muscovite Russia respectively, have an introductory character: they are intended to give some conception of the stock of political ideas current in Russia before the beginning of her close contact with Western Europe."

The book is informative, well-organized, and clearly written. It would be an excellent supplement to readings in Russian history and European intellectual thought.

STALIN'S FOREIGN POLICY REAPPRAISED. By MARSHALL D. SHULMAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 320 pages, bibliography, notes, and index, \$6.50.)

Ten years after the death of Stalin, Western scholarship has produced a first-rate analysis of Soviet foreign policy during the final years of Stalin's reign. Dr. Shulman has explored the record, subjected shopworn (often faulty) assumptions to critical review, and presented Stalin and his foreign policy in revelatory perspective. He believes that Stalin, in his conduct of foreign policy, was astute, cautious and realistic, and that his responses "to changes in the world environment, and particularly to changes in power relationships" were largely rational.

Professor Shulman sets the postwar po-

litical scene, and then dispassionately and incisively develops Soviet policy on the German Question, NATO, and "coexistence." There are excellent chapters on Moscow's manipulation of Peace Movements, reaction to the Marshall Plan, and relations with the satellite states. One key point in Shulman's analysis is his convincing case that the foundations for the imaginative and far-ranging innovations in post-1963 Soviet foreign policy "were laid during the years of Stalin's leadership." He notes that Moscow hopes to obtain its global objectives "through the conjuncture of a number of factors: an acceptance of Soviet military ascendancy, a demonstrated superiority of the Soviet economic system as a mode of organizing human and material resources, the detachment of the underdeveloped areas from the Western bloc, the inadequacies of the capitalist economic and social systems."

This is an important book. It is "must" reading for anyone interested in Soviet foreign policy, and in prospects of a lasting detente between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1918-48. By PAUL E. ZINNER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 264 pages, tables and index, \$5.95.)

The Communist *coup* in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, sparked Western rearmament and creation of NATO. It was as shocking as it was unexpected. But, according to Professor Zinner, "the events of February, 1948, were merely the logical conclusion of a process begun much earlier. The foundations of the conquest were laid during World War II."

The first section develops the "nature of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the origin and development of the Communist

Party from 1918 to 1938." The second section focuses on World War II and the evolution "of the Communist strategy of conquest in conjunction with the destruction of the political and legal fabric of Czechoslovakia at the hands of the Germans and the groundswell of sentiment in favor of a drastic reorientation of domestic and foreign policies. A final section on the national and democratic revolution deals with events from the liberation of the country to the *coup-d'état*."

A skillful, scholarly, sophisticated case study of a "peaceful Communist takeover," this study has a particular timeliness. It eschews any simplified explanations for the Czech coup. The ineptitude of the democratic parties, the fragmentation of social groups, the persistence and pervasiveness of nationality feuds, and the self-confidence of local Communists who believed, perhaps unwarrantedly, that they could rely on Soviet military might for assistance if necessary, are all dealt with by Professor Zinner. This is an informative, well-conceived, lucidly written study.

BOLSHEVIKS IN THE UKRAINE: THE SECOND CAMPAIGN, 1918-1919. By ARTHUR E. ADAMS. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. 440 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.75.)

The reasons for the Bolshevik triumph over their innumerable opponents during the critical, halycon days of 1918-1920 are still subject to considerable controversy. Several extensive campaigns were conducted to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Out of the confusion and complexity surrounding events in the Ukraine, Professor Adams has produced a brilliant, moving, fascinating account of "the Bolsheviks' second campaign in the Ukraine from November, 1918, to June, 1919, and its immediate consequences for the Bolsheviks and the Ukraine."

His central characters emerge from the profusion of political developments as human beings and influencers of history: the Soviet General Antonov-Ovseenko; the

Cossack Ataman Grigorev; Vinnichenko, and other Ukrainian nationalists. Behind the central participants loom the figures of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Voroshilov, Kamenov, and the uncertainties and jealousies and rivalries that swirled beneath the surface. Finally, there is the role of the land-hungry Ukrainian peasants, with their thirst for land, freedom, and self-rule, their passions, suffering, and aspirations.

The author describes "the events of the second Campaign, their influence upon Bolshevik administrative ideas and practices, and their larger significance for the Communists, for Ukrainian nationalist groups, and for the Ukraine itself." He does this with insight, imagination, and scrupulous scholarship. The intricacies of the internal and external developments are unraveled for the reader with remarkable clarity. This is a first-class study, eminently readable, absorbing, and based on extensive investigation of all available sources.

THE COMMUNIST FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM. By FREDERIC L. PRYOR. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. 296 pages, appendix, selected bibliography, and index, \$7.50.)

The author concentrates this study "on how foreign trade was carried out rather than what was being traded or negotiated." There are chapters on "The Role of Foreign Trade in the C.M.E.A. Nations"; "Problems of Planning and Organization of Foreign Trade"; "Criteria for Decision-Making"; "The Price-Setting Process"; "The Mechanisms in Intra-Bloc Foreign Trade"; and "The Future of Communist Trade."

The book is written for the economist and the specialist. It is a detailed, sophisticated treatment of a complex and important subject. In conclusion, the author observes that "The foreign trade system of the Communist Bloc is still in its infancy. Institutions and ideas are in flux and an experimental mood prevails. A.Z.R.

SOVIET POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA

(Continued from page 291)

The economic burden of Cuba may be a motivating factor. Furthermore, better relations with the United States would be an additional precaution against another serious crisis.

Although Soviet policies in Latin America have come full circle, the overall attitude of the Soviet Union has changed. Popular and scholarly interest in the peoples and social development in the area has increased. Celebrations and demonstrations on behalf of Latin America and Cuba have become commonplace.²¹ There is now an institute of the Academy of Sciences devoted exclusively to Latin America, and Marxian analyses of the area are numerous.²² The Soviet Union now recognizes that Latin America is changing and its revolutionary potential is high. But the problem remains how to influence this change without setting off the bomb.

²¹ By the middle of 1962, Soviet broadcasting to Latin America had increased 60 per cent over 1960 and including 45.5 hours in Spanish and 17.5 hours in Portuguese.

²² A new section on Latin America was also established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at about the same time.

SOVIET-JEWISH MINORITY

(Continued from page 302)

Chaim Suller, the editor of the New York Communist-Yiddish newspaper *Morgen Freiheit*, on returning from a trip to the Soviet Union, quoted Alexei Surkov, First Secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the effect that steps were being planned to revive Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. According to Suller's announcement, the plan would provide for (1) the establishment of a Yiddish publishing house, (2) the opening of a Yiddish theater, (3) the publication of a Yiddish newspaper, (4) the publication of a Yiddish literary quarterly, and (5) the calling of an all-Union conference of Jewish writers and cultural workers.

Two months later, in conversation with a delegation of the Central Committee of the Canadian Workers' Progressive party, Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev, members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, were already speaking about the Jewish question in more guarded terms, and there was no longer any mention of a Yiddish newspaper or theater, or a conference of writers and cultural workers.

Since then, statements of one kind or another have been made, but today, eight years after the Surkov-Suller announcement, the Soviet Union has yet to see a Yiddish publishing house, a single professional Yiddish theater, a single Yiddish newspaper (except for a two-page local sheet published in 1,000 copies three times a week in Birobidjan), or any conference of Jewish writers and cultural workers. All that has appeared have been a few selected Yiddish books (less than 10 in all these years) and a bi-monthly literary periodical under the vigilant control of a most zealous apologist for Soviet Jewish policy, Aaron Vergilis.

This is the total result of eight years of implementation of the very modest program drawn up in 1956 for "reviving Jewish cultural life." One other item may be added to the plus column: since the summer of 1955, Jewish concerts, literary readings and, occasionally, plays by amateur or semi-professional groups have been given before large Jewish audiences and have served Soviet Jews as a kind of substitute for a national cultural life.

In recent years, the Western press has frequently dealt with the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union. What has attracted attention, however, are not the practical aspects of the Soviet minorities policy, which has been all but forgotten, but two sets of facts which, while they have only peripheral significance for a minorities policy in the strict sense, are very painfully affecting the lives of Soviet Jews.

The first of these is the rigorous criminal prosecution of economic offenses with wide application of the death sentence, in most cases to Jews, and a treatment of this in the press which clearly aims at creating the im-

pression in the public mind that the chief offenders in all these acts of theft, corruption and swindling are Jews. Secondly, there is the sharply intensified campaign against Judaism which, again, is being depicted—and this is something new—as a fight against thieves and other criminals. These facts bear the unmistakable trace of anti-Semitism.

IMAGE OF WEST EUROPE

(Continued from page 285)

aciously-held Leninist image of the Western world was, and is, reinforced by the discords apparent within the Western alliance system and by the range and character of Soviet objectives in Europe. Since the rigidity of the image varies according to subject, one may hypothesize that ideological conceptions are less amenable to change where vital security interests are involved. This implies a continuing Soviet hostility to all Western efforts at integration.

However, dramatic and continuing Western unity could be the catalyst to induce modifications in the Soviet image of the West, and, concomitantly, in Moscow's willingness to negotiate the problems of European security. The vitality of the Common Market, the impact that it is obviously having upon Soviet and East European thinking, and the strains that COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in East Europe) has been experiencing, are interacting to bring about changes, and possibly a new realism, in Soviet perceptions of Western European developments.

Without meaning to magnify the significance of varied but modest modifications in recent Soviet positions, or attributing to them any long-run implications, there are several straws in the wind which hold the promise of further Soviet accommodations to Europe's drive toward integration and unity. First, the Soviets, regardless of their ultimate, autarkic, bloc-centered aspirations, still must trade with the Common Market countries. To obtain favorable tariff concessions and expand trade, they may have to moderate some of their uncompromising hostility and,

more specifically, agree to negotiate tariff reduction not (as in the past) on a bilateral basis with each member government, but with the Common Market's six-nation Executive Commission.

Second, Moscow is under pressure from the Communist parties in the Common Market countries to adopt a more flexible approach. Recognizing the economic benefits that the Common Market has brought to the economies of their respective countries, and aware of the strong current of "European unity" sentiment, West European Communists argue that "the exigencies of scientific progress and of the development of production forces call for the widening of markets and the internationalization of economic life." In other words, local Communists want the green light to make their influence felt in the supra-national institutions of the European Economic Community, and not merely in national parliaments and trade unions. They may also feel unhappy because they are isolated from a movement, i.e., European unity, which enjoys growing popular support.

Third, there have been newspaper reports that the Soviets have put out feelers intended to explore the possibility of establishing formal relations with the Common Market (E.E.C.). By accrediting a permanent mission to E.E.C. headquarters in Brussels, they would be taking a major step toward regularizing their relationship with the new, emerging Europe.

Finally, the Soviets may seek a *status quo cordiale* with Western Europe because they are alarmed at the widening rift with Peking, are under ever greater pressure from the East European countries to allow more economic, technical, and cultural "windows to the West," and are beset by severe economic difficulties at home.

Whatever the reasons behind the current thaw in the Soviet approach toward Western Europe, there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant the assumption of a fundamental and permanent shift in outlook. Soviet writings continue to mirror familiar Soviet fears and suspicions, as well as ambitions and expectations.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of September, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab Summit Conference

Sept. 5—In the U.A.R., 13 Arab chiefs-of-state open a conference on the issue of Israeli diversion of the Jordan River waters.

Sept. 11—The 13 Arab leaders end their conference. A final communiqué discloses that a plan has been approved to thwart Israel's use of the Jordan River; the communiqué urges that Arab water projects, to cut off the Jordan River from Israel, begin at once. The communiqué also condemns British policy in the Federation of South Arabia.

Berlin

Sept. 8—A.D.N., the East German press service, announces that elderly East Berliners will be allowed to visit relatives in West Berlin and West Germany.

Sept. 23—The West German government approves an agreement with East Germany whereby West Berliners will be permitted to visit relatives in East Berlin.

Sept. 24—Officials of West Berlin and of East Germany sign a West Berlin pass plan.

Disarmament

Sept. 13—The 13th Pugwash Conference opens in Czechoslovakia; Eastern and Western scientists discuss the peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Sept. 16—U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sends a message to the Geneva disarmament conferees expressing U.S. determination to work for peace and "to bring the nuclear arms race under control."

Sept. 17—The disarmament conference recesses.

European Economic Community

Sept. 29—A West German plan to link the members of the E.E.C. (Common Market) in some form of political union is presented to deputies belonging to West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's Christian Democratic party. Earlier this year Erhard had promised French President Charles de Gaulle that he would offer such a plan.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Sept. 7—World Bank President George D. Woods speaks at the opening session of the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some 102 nations are represented.

Sept. 11—At a news conference at the close of the 5-day conference, Woods declares that the World Bank will not lend money to countries failing to make proper compensation for seizing private foreign investment.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Sept. 22—At a news conference, the British and U.S. NATO commanders declare that Russian planes, ships and submarines are observing the NATO naval exercise, Team Work, being staged over the Atlantic Ocean.

Organization of African Unity

Sept. 5—The O.A.U. special session on the Congo opens in Ethiopia. (See also Congo.)

United Nations

Sept. 9—The U.N. mediator on Cyprus, Sakari S. Tuomioja, dies. (See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*.)

Sept. 11—In a memorandum to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson supports the recommendations of the U.N. 3-man team for ending Cambodian-South Vietnamese border conflicts. The U.N. team has suggested that an observer mission be sent to Cambodia and that the border areas be marked. Cambodia sends a memorandum opposing the proposal.

Sept. 17—In a 9-2 vote, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia veto a Security Council resolution deploring Indonesian aggression against the Federation of Malaysia.

Sept. 18—In a protest note to the Security Council, Israel asks that the Council take note of aggressive designs advanced by the Arab Summit conferees. (See also *Intl, Arab Summit Conference*.)

Western European Union

Sept. 9—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak proposes, before a meeting of members of Parliament from nations belonging to the W.E.U., that the 6 Common Market countries and Great Britain set up a 3-man team to work on a draft plan for political union. The W.E.U. is composed of Britain and the 6 Common Market countries.

AFGHANISTAN

Sept. 19—The Grand Assembly (Loe Jirga) approves a new constitution providing for a parliament responsible to the people, an independent judiciary, and the gradual diminution of the powers of the monarchy.

ALGERIA

Sept. 20—Elections for Parliament are held. A single list of candidates from the National Liberation Front is submitted to the voters.

BOLIVIA

Sept. 20—A government communiqué discloses that government forces have put

down an antigovernment uprising in eastern Bolivia.

Sept. 22—Former President Hernan Siles Zuazo and 33 other politicians are exiled to Paraguay after being accused of plotting against President Victor Paz Estenssoro's government.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

Canada

Sept. 16—Representatives of the Canadian and U.S. governments ratify the Columbia River treaty for joint development of water storage and hydroelectric projects.

Cyprus

Sept. 4—Dean Acheson, who served as an informal adviser at the mediation talks in Geneva, returns to Washington to confer with U.S. President Johnson. Acheson warns that the Cyprus situation is grave, and the threat of war very serious.

Sept. 9—The Cypriote government declares that the Turkish Cypriote sections of Famagusta and Larnaca will no longer be restricted from receiving food supplies.

Sept. 10—Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu announces that Turkey will deliver food to Turkish Cypriotes next week under armed convoy.

Sept. 12—U.N. Commander General Kodendera S. Thimayya announces that President Makarios will permit Turkish food shipments to be sent to Kokkina. The food will have to go through ports under Greek Cypriote control.

Sept. 14—A U.N. spokesman announces that Makarios has agreed to permit a Turkish ship with food supplies to enter Famagusta port.

Sept. 15—Makarios proposes a peace settlement under which Greek Cypriotes would end the blockade of Turkish Cypriote areas; fortifications would be removed and a general amnesty proclaimed; financial help would also be provided for displaced Turkish Cypriotes.

Sept. 16—It is reported that the U.S. has offered to contribute \$2 million and Britain,

\$1 million, to defray the cost of maintaining the U.N. peace force on Cyprus for an additional 3 months. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant appoints Galo Plaza Lasso as U.N. mediator for Cyprus; he succeeds Tuomioja. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Sept. 17—Meeting in Athens, Makarios and Greek Premier George Papandreou announce complete agreement on a peaceful settlement for Cyprus. Turkey informs Greece that she has cancelled the deportation order for 1,810 Greek residents in Turkey.

Sept. 19—In Moscow to discuss a Soviet aid offer, Cypriote Minister of Commerce Andreas Araouzons confers with Premier Khrushchev.

Sept. 25—The U.N. Security Council votes to extend its peace force in Cyprus for 3 months ending December 26. Secretary-General U Thant declares that he has named Brazilian Carlos Alfredo Bernardes to serve as his personal representative in Cyprus. U Thant announces that the Turkish and Cypriote governments have agreed to place the key Cypriote highway from Nicosia to Kyrenia under U.N. control.

Sept. 30—Turkish Cypriotes set up blockades along the Nicosia-Kyrenia highway following controversy over the agreement to place the road under U.N. supervision.

Great Britain

Sept. 7—The Soviet Union and a group of 3 British companies sign a £30 million (\$84 million) trade agreement under which Britain will build a large part of a fiber-making plant in Siberia. In addition to the 3 companies, a British (Midland) bank will lend some \$67.2 million to the Soviet Union for 15 years.

Sept. 25—Queen Elizabeth II formally dissolves Parliament; elections for a new parliament will be held October 15.

India

Sept. 1—India requests urgent grain shipments. It is reported that Britain and the

U.S. have been asked to divert grain ships to India.

Sept. 8—U.S. Agriculture Secretary Orville L. Freeman announces that U.S. wheat shipments to India will be increased 200,000 tons a month through November, 1964, for a total of 600,000 tons monthly.

Sept. 12—It is reported that in a Soviet-Indian arms agreement, India will buy Soviet MIG planes and tanks. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 21—Speaking in Parliament on his recent trip to the Soviet Union and on a visit to the U.S. in May, Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan reports on a 5-year plan to build India's military defenses.

Malawi

Sept. 7—Three cabinet ministers are dismissed by Prime Minister H. Kamuzu Banda; 2 cabinet ministers resign.

Sept. 8—Banda tells Parliament that the 5 former cabinet ministers were involved in a Chinese Communist plot to overthrow him.

Malaysia, Federation of

Sept. 2—The Malaysian government reports that Indonesian paratroopers have landed in Malaysia, and charges Indonesia with "naked aggression."

Sept. 3—Accusing Indonesia of aggression, Malaysia asks the U.N. Security Council to consider its complaint against the landing of Indonesian paratroopers. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Sept. 5—Following 2 days of Malay-Chinese fighting in Singapore, the Government declares all of the Federation a security zone.

Sept. 6—In Singapore, fighting between Malays and Chinese continues.

Sept. 8—Several hundred British soldiers are airlifted to Malaysia as a "precautionary" step.

Sept. 11—British planes attack suspected Indonesian guerrilla positions in Malaysia.

Malta

Sept. 20—At midnight tonight Malta becomes independent, ending 165 years of

British rule. She will remain in the Commonwealth.

Sept. 21—Britain's Prince Philip presents the formal documents of independence to Prime Minister George Borg Olivier.

BRITISH TERRITORIES, THE

British Guiana

Sept. 25—The Governor, Sir Richard Luyt, announces that the Parliament has been dissolved; elections will be held on December 7 for a new unicameral legislature.

South Arabia, Federation of

Sept. 21—It is announced that 1 sultanate and 2 sheikdoms in Britain's Western Aden Protectorate have been formally admitted to the Federation.

Southern Rhodesia

Sept. 6—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith arrives in Britain for talks on independence for Southern Rhodesia.

Sept. 10—At the close of 4 days of talks between British Prime Minister Douglas-Home and Ian Smith, an agreement is signed; Britain agrees to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia provided it is satisfied that independence is desired by a majority of both blacks and whites.

Sept. 11—The Government increases by 10 per cent the wealth necessary to qualify to vote in a parliamentary election.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

CHILE

Sept. 4—Chileans go to the polls to elect a president. Senator Salvador Allende Gossens, head of the Popular Action Front (pro-Communist), concedes the election to Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat and a moderate leftist. Frei will succeed President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Sept. 3—The rebel commander of Stanleyville, Nicolas Olenga, in a message to U.N.

Secretary-General U Thant, warns that the 500 white persons remaining in the city are being held as hostages to prevent air attacks by the Congolese government. Olenga threatens to fire on any plane coming near Stanleyville.

Sept. 4—Premier Moise Tshombe announces that white mercenaries, recruited from the Republic of South Africa to help put down the rebellion in the Congo, will be sent home.

Sept. 6—Premier Tshombe tells the council of ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Ethiopia, that he will dismiss all white mercenaries if the O.A.U. member states will provide armed forces to help quell the Congolese rebellion.

Sept. 7—A radio broadcast from the rebel-held city of Stanleyville announces that Christophe Gbenye has been named president of the "Congolese People's Republic Government," with headquarters in Stanleyville. Gbenye helped found the National Liberation Committee, a pro-Communist movement based in Brazzaville in the Congo Republic.

Sept. 10—The O.A.U. meeting, in a 9-point resolution, appeals for an end to all fighting in the Congo and to all foreign intervention in "the internal affairs of the Congo." The O.A.U. asks Tshombe to give up the use of white mercenaries; it creates a commission to bring about a peaceful settlement for the Congo.

Sept. 22—The chairman of the Congo Reconciliation Commission, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, announces that the C.R.C. will send a 5-man delegation to the U.S. to urge that all U.S. military troops and supplies be withdrawn.

Sept. 23—The U.S. government informs the delegation that it will not meet with it unless Tshombe is also present.

President Joseph Kasavubu declares that the Congo will no longer "abide by the decisions" of the O.A.U. He sends a telegram to the O.A.U. Secretary-General, Diallo Telli, criticizing the O.A.U. for intervention in Congolese internal affairs.

CUBA

Sept. 17—The Havana radio broadcasts comments made last night by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro to the effect that, because of falling sugar prices, Cuban purchases abroad will be reduced.

DENMARK

(See also *Greece*.)

Sept. 22—Elections for Parliament are held.

Sept. 23—The coalition government of Social Democrats and Radical Liberals resigns because it lost its one-vote majority in the elections.

Sept. 25—Premier Jens Otto Krag informs King Frederik IX that he has formed a minority government of Social Democrats; the Social Democrats are the strongest party, with 76 seats in the 179-member Parliament.

FINLAND

Sept. 11—A coalition cabinet is formed with Agrarian party leader Johannes Virolainen as premier.

FRANCE

Sept. 20—President Charles de Gaulle embarks on a 10-nation tour of South America.

Sept. 25—De Gaulle is welcomed by crowds in Lima, Peru, after visits to Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Sept. 21—Premier Otto Grotewohl dies at the age of 70 following a long illness.

Sept. 24—The *Volkskammer* (parliament) names Willi Stoph as the new premier.

GREECE

(See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*)

Sept. 20—King Constantine of the Hellenes marries Danish Princess Anne-Marie.

HUNGARY

Sept. 13—In Hungary for a visit, President Tito of Yugoslavia confers with Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar.

INDONESIA

(See also *British Commonwealth, Federation of Malaysia*)

Sept. 29—President Sukarno arrives in Moscow for an official visit. He is welcomed by Khrushchev.

ITALY

Sept. 4—A document prepared shortly before his death last month by the Italian Communist party secretary-general, Palmiro Togliatti, is published. The memorandum criticizes the Soviet plan to hold an international Communist conference, but expresses Togliatti's sympathy for Moscow's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

LAOS

Sept. 15—At the Paris meeting of neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong (leader of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao rebels), Prince Souphanouvong offers to withdraw from positions taken in the Plaine des Jarres.

Sept. 16—Prince Souphanouvong refuses to accept supervision by the International Control Commission (Poland, Canada and India) in the Plaine des Jarres.

Sept. 18—Following talks with Prince Souphanouvong and rightist Prince Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma announces that the 3 leaders will formally meet on September 21.

Sept. 21—Laotian leaders agree on a 3-point agenda including: a cease-fire agreement, reconvening the 14-nation conference on Laos, and setting up a coalition government. The talks are to be continued at the ministerial level.

LEBANON

Sept. 23—Charles Helou is inaugurated as the fourth Lebanese president.

RUMANIA

Sept. 7—Rumanian President Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and President Tito of Yugoslavia formally inaugurate a joint dam and power project along the Danube.

Sept. 27—Premier Ion Georgehe Maurer is

received by Soviet Premier Khrushchev; Maurer is en route to Peking to attend the 15th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist regime.

SAN MARINO

Sept. 14—In elections to the Grand and General Council, the Christian Democrats increase their majority in the 60-seat national legislature.

SWEDEN

Sept. 20—Elections are held for the 233-man lower house of Parliament.

Sept. 21—Unofficial returns disclose that Premier Tage Erlander's Social Democratic party has won 117 seats; the Opposition Conservatives, 28; the Opposition Liberals, 40 seats; the agrarian Center party, 37.

TURKEY

(See *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*)

U.S.S.R., THE

Sept. 1—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev confers with Czech President Antonin Novotny in Prague.

Sept. 2—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist organ) publishes an editorial accusing Communist China of printing maps claiming land areas belonging to the Soviet Union, Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim for China.

Sept. 3—In a note to the West German government, Soviet Premier Khrushchev announces his willingness to visit Bonn if invited.

Sept. 4—In a speech in Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev criticizes Soviet allies (namely Italy and Rumania) who wish to put off the proposed international Communist conference.

Sept. 5—Khrushchev returns to Moscow.

Sept. 11—Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan arrives in the Soviet Union on a state visit. Earlier, Indian Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan signed an arms pact with Soviet leaders in Moscow. (See also *British Commonwealth, India*.)

Sept. 15—Japanese sources report that in

a meeting with 15 visiting members of the Japanese legislature, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union possessed a super-weapon that could wipe out all humanity.

Sept. 16—A World Youth Forum opens in Moscow attended by young persons from 120 countries.

Sept. 17—Khrushchev declares that he did not tell Japanese visitors that the new superweapon could destroy all mankind; he declares it is not a more powerful nuclear bomb.

Sept. 19—Khrushchev addresses a reception for delegates to the World Youth Forum; he promises Soviet military aid for "any people fighting against oppressors."

Izvestia (government newspaper) publishes an official transcript of Khrushchev's remarks to visiting Japanese legislators; Khrushchev's reported remarks about a superweapon resulted from a mistranslation.

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

Sept. 9—A truck driver, making a delivery to a stockyard, hits and kills 2 pickets; the dead men were members of the National Farmers Organization, which has been striking to prevent livestock deliveries.

Civil Rights

(See *Segregation*)

Economy, The

Sept. 3—A minimum wage of \$1.15 an hour becomes effective today; workers in retail, service and construction trades will benefit primarily.

The unemployment rate for August rises to 5.1 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *British Commonwealth, Canada and Cyprus*)

Sept. 7—The U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell D. Taylor, arrives in Washington for talks on the situation in Vietnam. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Sept. 9—U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson announces that he has named 16 prominent

persons to "be consulted" on problems of peace and national defense.

Sept. 11—The State Department announces that Professor Heinz Barwich, a ranking East German nuclear physicist, has been granted asylum in the U.S.

Sept. 16—President Johnson joins Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson at ceremonies marking the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty, effective today.

Sept. 29—President Johnson, accompanied by NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, visits the Strategic Air Command headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk states that Communist China may test its first nuclear device shortly.

Government

Sept. 1—President Johnson signs a \$14 million rehabilitation and damages bill to compensate Seneca Indians for loss of land to be taken for a reservoir.

Sept. 2—President Johnson signs a \$1.1 billion housing program that includes incentives to landlords for rehabilitation of slum properties.

The Senate completes congressional action on a bill requiring banks to notify federal agencies of any "changes in control or management."

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, by order of President Johnson yesterday, begins an inquiry into charges that a \$25,000 kickback to the Democratic party was given to the 1960 Kennedy-Johnson campaign after a contract for construction of a public stadium had been awarded. Senator John J. Williams (Delaware Republican), who made the accusation, charged that Robert (Bobby) Baker was one of 3 men involved.

Sept. 3—President Johnson signs a bill to establish a 25-man National Council of the Arts.

Johnson signs a wilderness bill to protect 9.1 million acres of forest and mountain areas from exploitation. The law provides that the tracts of lands be classified as a permanent National Wilderness Preservation System.

Johnson also signs a bill creating a Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund to acquire outdoor recreation facilities.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy presents his resignation to President Johnson. (See also *U.S. Politics*.)

Sept. 4—President Johnson signs a \$287.6 million bill for a 5-year program to improve nurses' training, and to assist student nurses.

Sept. 10—The Senate votes, 75-3, to direct the Rules Committee to reopen its investigation into the affairs of Robert Baker.

Sept. 11—President Johnson visits Florida areas devastated by Hurricane Dora. Last night, Johnson declared that the damaged sectors of Florida and Georgia would be classified as "major disaster areas."

Sept. 24—Voting 44-38, the Senate approves a "sense of Congress" resolution (introduced by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana) advising lower federal courts to give state legislatures a reasonable amount of time, but not exceeding 6 months, for reapportionment before the courts put into effect any reapportionment orders. The resolution also says that the "sense of Congress" is to permit states to conduct their next legislative elections on the basis of existing districts. The resolution lacks the force of law; it is a substitute for the Dirksen rider to the foreign aid bill, which sought to delay, by legislation, the Supreme Court ruling on reapportionment.

Sept. 26—The Federal Bureau of Investigation in a report to the President, declares that riots in northern cities during the summer were not race riots "in the accepted meaning of the phrase"; the report finds no pattern of "systematic planning or organization."

President Johnson, in a written comment on the F.B.I. report, reveals that he has asked the F.B.I. to offer riot training to all police departments; Army methods of controlling riots will be taught to the National Guard.

Sept. 27—The report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President

John F. Kennedy is made public. The Warren Commission report declares that the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, was committed by Lee Harvey Oswald, working alone; and that Jack Ruby's subsequent slaying of Oswald was an individual action. The Commission rules out any conspiracy or complicity charges. The Commission criticizes the F.B.I. and the Secret Service, and urges increased protection for presidents. The Commission also suggests that the murder of a United States president be made a federal crime.

President Johnson names a committee of 4 to study the implementation of the Warren Commission's proposals. Members include Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; acting Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy; and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John A. McCone.

Sept. 30—It is reported that leaders from business, the academic world and the Administration have been working in study groups to plan policies for President Johnson should he be elected.

Labor

Sept. 2—At a meeting of national, state and local labor leaders in Washington, the President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, George Meany, outlines the A.F.L.-C.I.O. program for compliance with the Civil Rights Act.

Sept. 9—The U.A.W. and the Chrysler Corporation announce a new 3-year contract with increased wages, and greater fringe and pension benefits. U.A.W. President Walter Reuther declares that the union values the increase under the contract at 53.25 cents per hour; Chrysler values it at 57.25 cents an hour.

Sept. 18—The Ford Motor Company and the U.A.W. announce that they have agreed on a new contract styled after the agreement with Chrysler. The cost is estimated

at 63 cents per hour in increased wages and benefits.

Sept. 21—A negotiator for the nation's railroads, J. E. Wolfe, and the spokesman for 6 railroad shop craft unions, Michael Fox, announce that a tentative agreement has been reached on 4 major issues; the virtually nation-wide strike threatened for tomorrow is called off.

Sept. 25—The U.A.W. strikes against the General Motors Corporation because G.M. will not meet union demands for improved labor conditions. Some 260,000 workers walk out.

Federal mediator Francis O'Neill announces that all threat of a strike by 6 railway shop craft unions has been ended. Railroad management agrees to union demands for job protection and for compensation for job loss due to automation.

Sept. 30—At midnight, longshoremen strike at ports from Maine to Texas after negotiations by management and the International Longshoremen's Association for a new contract fail.

Military

Sept. 4—*Ogo*, an advanced scientific satellite some 59 feet long, is orbited. *Ogo* (orbiting geophysical observatory) will record space data.

Sept. 16—*Ogo* is reported "crippled" but is sending back information.

Sept. 17—Addressing crowds in Sacramento, California, President Johnson declares that the U.S. has developed 2 systems for intercepting and destroying enemy satellites. The systems are operationally ready. Johnson discloses that the U.S. has set up an "over-the-horizon" radar system to give earlier warning of missile attack. (See also *Intl, Disarmament.*)

Sept. 18—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara declares that 2 U.S. defense systems "have been effectively tested and have intercepted satellites in space, their missiles passing so close as to be" able to destroy the satellites' warheads.

Sept. 21—The B-70, a 2,000 mile-per-hour jet, is given its first test flight.

Politics

Sept. 1—The 166-member general board of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations unanimously adopts a statement expressing organized labor's support for the Democratic presidential ticket; the statement criticizes Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater and vice-presidential candidate William Miller.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy wins the New York State Democratic nomination for U.S. Senator.

Sept. 3—Formally opening his campaign in Prescott, Arizona, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater declares that he would implement conservative policies gradually; he declares that prevailing social welfare and economic policies must be honored.

Sept. 5—The chairman of the American Communist party, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, dies while visiting Moscow. She was 74.

Sept. 6—Vice-presidential candidate William Miller discloses a financial report listing his net wealth at \$260,730.57.

Sept. 7—Speaking in Cadillac Square in Detroit, Michigan, President Johnson launches his presidential campaign. He affirms his desire to safeguard peace, and in a rebuttal to Goldwater, declares "there is no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon."

Sept. 8—Goldwater criticizes the \$11 billion tax cut approved by Congress this year. He recommends a 25 per cent overall tax reduction over a 5-year period.

Sept. 9—Goldwater charges that the Kennedy administration timed the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to influence the 1962 elections; he warns that such a scheme may be repeated by the Johnson administration.

Sept. 11—The Republican and Democratic national chairmen, Dean Burch and John Bailey respectively, sign the Code of Fair Campaign Practices.

Sept. 16—In a television broadcast, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond announces his decision to leave the Democratic party to help elect Goldwater.

Sept. 21—A Minneapolis accounting firm issues a report listing Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey's net assets at \$171,396. He is the Democratic vice-presidential candidate.

Sept. 24—A 3-judge U.S. Court cancels the November 3 Connecticut state legislature elections because the state legislature has not been able to agree on a reapportionment plan.

Sept. 28—Johnson tours 5 New England states; he urges responsible Republicans to support the Democratic ticket.

Sept. 29—On a whistle-stop tour of Ohio, Goldwater charges that the Johnson administration is "soft on communism."

Segregation

Sept. 1—One Negro child enrolls at the Carthage (Miss.) Elementary School. Eight other Negro children scheduled to register under federal court order do not appear.

A New York County grand jury reports that it finds Police Lieutenant Thomas Gilligan not guilty of any wrongdoing and refuses to indict him. In July, Gilligan shot and killed a Negro youth, which helped trigger racial rioting in New York City.

Sept. 4—A white jury in Georgia acquits 2 white men accused of killing Lemuel Penn, a Negro educator traveling through Georgia to his home in Washington, D.C.

Sept. 8—In Prince Edward County, Va., public schools are reopened after 5 years. Some 1,400 Negro and 7 white children attend; 1,200 white children remain in private schools.

Sept. 14—In New York City, 27 per cent of pupils are absent as schools open (normal absentee rate, 10 per cent). Absentees are protesting the Board of Education's plan pairing 4 predominantly white elementary schools with 4 predominantly Negro-Puerto Rican schools. The boycott is staged by the Parents and Taxpayers Coordinating Council and the Joint Council for Better Education, 2 groups, chiefly

white, opposed to compulsory busing of schoolchildren outside their neighborhoods to achieve integration. Nearly 13,000 schoolchildren are involved in the Board of Education's mandatory integration plan involving rezoning and transfers.

Sept. 15—On the second and last day of the boycott, some 233,000 students are absent.

Two Negroes are elected to the Tuskegee (Ala.) City Council; they defeat white opponents.

Sept. 17—In Queens in New York City, 189 schoolchildren transferred to different schools under the school integration plan attend special private classes set up by P.A.T. (Parents and Taxpayers) groups.

In Canton, Mississippi, 2 Negro churches, where voter registration programs have been carried on, are burned.

In Birmingham, Alabama, a 3-judge federal panel rules that the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act cannot be constitutionally applied to a restaurant not involved in interstate commerce.

Sept. 21—A 22-man federal grand jury opens an investigation in Mississippi of violations of federal civil rights laws; the murders of the 3 civil rights workers in June, 1964, will be included.

VATICAN, THE

Sept. 14—Pope Paul VI opens the third session of the Ecumenical Council. He urges Roman Catholic bishops to carve out new powers for themselves so that they may have a stronger voice in the affairs of the Church.

Sept. 15—The Vatican announces that an agreement has been signed with the Hungarian government in which the Church's right to govern and maintain communication with the Roman Catholic institutions there is recognized.

Sept. 29—The Council Fathers (some 2,500 cardinals, patriarchs, archbishops and bishops) vote in favor of allowing married men of "mature age" to enter the order of deacons.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Sept. 3—Major General Nguyen Khanh returns to Saigon from Dalat, where he has been resting. Khanh resumes the duties of premier; he dissolves the governing military triumvirate. Khanh reappoints Major General Duong Van Minh as chief-of-state. General Minh appeals to students and Buddhists to support the national government.

Sept. 4—Premier Nguyen Khanh announces that all army officers in ministerial posts have resigned. The 3-man military junta is to continue in power. He declares that after 2 months, he will hand over power to a civilian government.

Sept. 6—U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor flies home to report to President Johnson on the situation in Vietnam.

Sept. 8—Major General Duong Van Minh is named chairman of the military triumvirate. Minh is to name a new High Council of the nation to prepare a new constitution.

Sept. 9—Premier Khanh withdraws the month-old press censorship; he names 2 civilians to top government jobs. Khanh announces that he will serve as defense minister as well as premier.

Sept. 11—The U.S. House of Representatives foreign affairs subcommittee on the Far East makes public a one-page excerpt of testimony given yesterday by Maxwell D. Taylor; the excerpt reveals that Taylor has warned that it "would be a major disaster" if the U.S. were to withdraw from Vietnam.

Sept. 13—Dissident military forces led by 2 brigadier generals try to overthrow the Khanh government.

Sept. 14—The government radio station reports that Premier Khanh is still in control in Vietnam. Dissident rebel forces withdraw from points seized in Saigon.

Junior military leaders who rose to Premier Khanh's support sign a communiqué urging Khanh to dismiss all dishonest officials. If reforms are not carried out within 2 months, they promise to stage a revolt.

- Sept. 18—It is reported that 2 U.S. destroyers have engaged in an incident involving U.S. firing on hostile craft in the Gulf of Tonkin. The *Hsinhua* (Communist Chinese) press agency broadcasts a North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry statement; the statement notes that heavy explosions were heard and "flashes of light were spotted" in the vicinity of the 2 destroyers.
- Sept. 19—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara issues a statement revealing that 4 unidentified craft with "hostile intent" were fired on yesterday in the Gulf of Tonkin and that they "disappeared" afterwards.
- Sept. 23—Two U.S. bomber planes are shot down by Vietcong (pro-Communist rebels) guns.
- Sept. 24—It is reported that a special U.S. Navy mission has been sent to investigate the recent incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.
- Sept. 26—The High National Council, composed of 17 civilians and charged with setting up a new government and constitution, is inaugurated; its members include Buddhists and Roman Catholics.
- Sept. 30—Lieutenant General Tran Thien Khiem, a member of the 3-man junta, will leave the country on a tour, in a step to conciliate army leaders.

YEMEN

- Sept. 9—Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia and U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser confer on their conflict over Yemen, where the U.A.R. has supported the Republican government and Saudi Arabia, the royalists.
- Sept. 14—Prince Faisal and Nasser issue a joint communiqué; they will meet with the "parties involved for peaceful settlement" of the Yemeni dispute. Sources report that the agreement on ending the Yemeni war includes a 7-month armistice.
- Sept. 16—Saudi Arabian sources report that fighting between royalists and republicans in Yemen has ceased.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Sept. 16—President Tito returns from a 5-day trip to Hungary.
- Sept. 17—Yugoslavia establishes limited ties with COMECON (the Soviet Bloc's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance).

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